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PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL JUDGMENT AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING: DRAWING 




 Pharmaceutical manufacturers develop relationships with 
healthcare providers for several purposes, including the marketing 
and sale of their products. Professional associations give guidance 
to physicians and companies for managing these relationships 
ethically. Some practices permitted by these associations entail 
conflicts of interest. This Article explores two of these practices: (i) 
company funding of external educational seminars, conferences, 
and continuing medical education; and (ii) company-hosted speaker 
programs. The conflict of interest concerns raised by the former 
practice are manageable, and the practice should continue to be 
permitted subject to appropriate safeguards; however, the conflict 
of interest concerns raised by the latter practice create an unaccepta-
ble ethical hazard that cannot be managed. Company-hosted speaker 
programs should be prohibited. 
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INTRODUCTION
 Over the years, critics have questioned the relationship 
between drug manufacturers and medical practitioners.1 Recently, 
this relationship has faced a heightened level of scrutiny.2 A 2008 
study concluded that pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. “spend 
almost twice as much on promotion as they do on [research and 
development].”3 The study stated that annual promotional ex-
penditures in the U.S. might be as high as $57.5 billion.4 At the 
same time, other sources suggest that the figure might be as low 
as $27 billion5—still a formidable number. 
 Growing concern about marketing to practitioners has 
been fueled in part by the opioid crisis.6 Opioid manufacturers 
1 See Susan Heilbronner Fisher, Note, The Economic Wisdom of Regulat-
ing Pharmaceutical “Freebies,” 1991 DUKE L.J. 206, 209 (1991) (discussing 
Congressional scrutiny, going back to 1990, of pharmaceutical company de-
tailing practices). 
2 See John R. Washlick & Sidney Summers Welch, Physician-Vendor Mar-
keting and Financial Relationships Under Attack, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. 151,
153 (2008) (“The interaction between healthcare professionals and healthcare 
product manufacturers has come under increasing scrutiny.”). 
3 Marc-Andre Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New 
Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 
PLOS MED. 29, 32 (Jan. 2008). 
4 Id. at 31. 
5 Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical Industry Marketing and its 
Influence on Physicians and Patients, PEW PRESCRIPTION PROJECT (Nov. 11, 
2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2013/11/11 
/persuading-the-prescribers-pharmaceutical-industry-marketing-and-its-influ 
ence-on-physicians-and-patients [https://perma.cc/Y55Z-MFBR] (citing CEGEDIM 
STRATEGIC DATA, 2012 U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY PROMOTION SPENDING 
(2013)) [hereinafter Pew Fact Sheet]. 
6 See, e.g., Jessica Bartlett, Opioid Marketing Contributed to Overdose Ep-
idemic, Boston Medical Center Report Says, BOS. BUS. J. (Jan. 18, 2019, 11:11 
AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2019/01/18/opioid-marketing  
-contributed-to-overdose-epidemic.html [https://perma.cc/NZG5-5ZA3]; Andrew 
Joseph, Purdue Cemented Ties with Universities and Hospitals to Expand Opioid 
Sales, Documents Contend, STAT (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.statnews.com 
/2019/01/16/purdue-pharma-cemented-ties-to-universities-hospitals/ [https:// 
perma.cc/KXV8-EH2B] (“Purdue ... saw the sponsorship of a pain program at 
Mass. General as a way to gain sway at one of the most influential academic 
medical centers in the country and boost its revenues—by encouraging doctors to 
prescribe OxyContin and Purdue’s other opioids to more patients at higher 
doses and for longer periods of time ....”). 
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face litigation over their marketing practices, and the first major 
settlement, with the state of Oklahoma, included an agreement by 
one manufacturer to refrain from “visiting doctors to persuade them 
to buy its products, until 2026.”7 In the spring of 2019, five exec-
utives from Insys were convicted for paying doctors to boost sales of 
fentanyl, on the heels of earlier convictions of the company’s former 
Chief Executive and former Vice President of Sales.8
 As a part of its strategic emphasis on marketing, the modern 
pharmaceutical industry exerts a strong influence on the prescrip-
tion patterns of physicians.9 According to one recent commentary, 
“[P]harmaceutical marketing can distort prescribing behaviors, 
exposing patients to concomitant risks. Physicians tend to pre-
scribe drugs more frequently and non-rationally in response to 
pharmaceutical promotions.”10
 This phenomenon is highlighted in Wazana’s review of 
sixteen studies that provide some data on the impact of pharma-
ceutical gratuities to doctors.11 The data synthesis summary of 
Wazana’s analysis states in part, 
Physician interactions with pharmaceutical representatives 
were generally endorsed, began in medical school, and contin-
ued at a rate of about 4 times per month. Meetings with 
pharmaceutical representatives were associated with requests 
by physicians for adding the drugs to the hospital formulary 
7 Lenny Bernstein & Katie Zezima, Purdue Pharma, State of Oklahoma 
Reach Settlement in Landmark Opioid Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2019, 




8 Hannah Kuchler, Insys Founder Convicted in Opioid Bribery Case, FIN.
TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/f83fc974-6d09-11e9-80c7-60 
ee53e6681d (last visited ). 
9 Sheryl Calabro, Note, Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine: Placing the Blame Where It Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2254, 
2254 n.65 (2004). 
10 Recent Case, First Amendment—Commercial Speech—Second Circuit 
Holds That Prohibiting Truthful Off-Label Promotion of FDA-Approved Drugs by 
Pharmaceutical Representatives Violates First Amendment.—United States v. 
Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), 127 HARV. L. REV. 795, 802 (2013) (cita-
tions omitted). 
11 Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift 
Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 375 (2000). 
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and changes in prescribing practice.... Attending presentations 
given by pharmaceutical representative speakers was also asso-
ciated with nonrational prescribing.12
 These trends continue despite physicians’ recognition of the 
associated risks.13 Wazana notes, “Most [residents and physi-
cians in the studies] believe that representatives prioritize 
product promotion above patients’ welfare and are likely to use 
unethical practices.”14
 In light of such concerns, are pharmaceutical company re-
lationships with medical practitioners good or bad, or does it 
vary according to the behaviors and the circumstances? There 
are arguments to be made for and against the currently aggres-
sive practices of pharmaceutical companies.15 These are explored 
in this Article, which recommends maintaining some practices 
and changing others. 
 The Article focuses specifically on the close transactional 
relationships that develop between doctors and drug companies.16
Cozy connections among these two groups raise troubling conflict of 
interest concerns.17 We would hope that moral peril created by 
such conflict of interest among doctors in these situations is iso-
lated and rare. If so, at least the overall social impact might be 
contained, rather than pervasive. 
 Financial relationships between physicians and industry 
are the rule, however, rather than the exception.18 A study by 
Campbell et al. tallied the prevalence of “physician-industry re-
lationships.”19 The research revealed that in both 2004 and 
12 Id. at 373. 
13 See, e.g., Nicole Van Groningen, Opinion, Big Pharma Gives Your Doctor 




14 Wazana, supra note 11, at 375 (citations omitted). 
15 Id. at 373; see also Van Groningen, supra note 13. 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See infra Part III. 
18 Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician Professionalism and Changes in Physi-
cian-Industry Relationships from 2004 to 2009, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
1820, 1820 (2010). 
19 Id.
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2009, over 80% of doctors had one or more forms of financial re-
lationship with drug or medical device companies.20
 Although this figure decreased from 94% in 2004 to 84% 
in 2009,21 this reduction reflects a more focused industry strate-
gy for recruiting doctors as prescribers, rather than a curtail-
ment of industry influence on prescription decisions.22 According 
to Campbell, “The old approach was just to try to get as many 
docs as you can, blanket coverage, and establish relationships .... 
I think they’re being much more targeted and specific.”23
 Vukadin has described the sophisticated methods used by 
drug companies to target physicians for relationship-building 
and the marketing of their products.24 The companies begin by 
paying for data on physician prescribing habits and patterns.25
These data enable pharmaceutical representatives to under-
stand physician behavior and identify who among physicians are 
professional opinion leaders.26
 Vukadin further observes, “The pharmaceutical industry 
closely monitors all contacts with physicians. One service counts 
the number of visits by pharmaceutical representatives and 
ranks physicians based on their willingness to see pharmaceuti-
cal representatives: completely open, sometimes willing to see 
pharmaceutical representatives, or completely unwilling.”27 Well 
before business analytics initiatives ushered in the age of data-
driven business and marketing practices,28 pharmaceutical com-
panies were honing this approach.29
20 Charles Ornstein & Eric Sagara, How Much Are Drug Companies Pay-




22 Campbell et al., supra note 18, at 1825. 
23 Ornstein & Sagara, supra note 20. 
24 Katherine T. Vukadin, Failure-to-Warn: Facing Up to the Real Impact of 
Pharmaceutical Marketing on the Physician’s Decision to Prescribe, 50 TULSA 
L. REV. 75, 79–83 (2014). 
25 Id. at 79. 
26 Id.
27 Id. at 79–80 (internal citation omitted). 
28 For discussion of the trend toward using big data and analytics in mak-
ing business decisions, see MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., THE AGE OF ANALYTICS:
COMPETING IN A DATA-DRIVEN WORLD 4 (Dec. 2016), https://www.mckinsey 
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 In 2012, Cegedim studied how pharmaceutical companies 
invest in marketing.30 They classified these as detailing (described 
as “face-to-face promotional activities directed toward physicians 
and pharmacy directors”), samples, educational and promotional 
meetings, promotional mailings, journal and web advertisements, 
direct-to-consumer advertising, continuing medical education, and 
grants to health advocacy organizations.31 All but two of these 
categories—direct-to-consumer advertising and grants to health 
advocacy organizations—are aimed at medical and pharmaceu-
tical practitioners.32
 Historically, it makes sense that pharmaceutical marketing 
has focused primarily on healthcare practitioners.33 Until recently, 
direct-to-consumer (DTC) mass advertising was not practiced in 
the United States.34 Traditional self-restraint among pharmaceuti-
cal firms reflected the “learned intermediary” doctrine, under which 
access to drugs was—as it still in many ways is—moderated 
through a gateway of trained healthcare professionals.35
.com/business-functions/mckinsey-analytics/our-insights/the-age-of-analytics  
-competing-in-a-data-driven-world [https://perma.cc/UQE4-B5B6].  
Five years ago, the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) released 
Big data: The next frontier for innovation, competition, and 
productivity. In the years since, data science has continued to 
make rapid advances, particularly on the frontiers of machine 
learning and deep learning. Organizations now have troves of 
raw data combined with powerful and sophisticated analytics 
tools to gain insights that can improve operational performance 
and create new market opportunities. Most profoundly, their 
decisions no longer have to be made in the dark or based on 
gut instinct; they can be based on evidence, experiments, and 
more accurate forecasts. 
Id. at Preface. 
29 Kalman Applbaum, Pharmaceutical Marketing and the Invention of the 
Medical Consumer, 3 PLOS MED. 445, 445 (2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pmc/articles/PMC1434507/pdf/pmed.0030189.pdf [https://perma.cc/CQR3-4BCW]. 
30 See Pew Fact Sheet, supra note 5. 
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See Julie Donohue, A History of Drug Advertising: The Evolving Roles of 
Consumers and Consumer Protection, 84 MILBANK Q. 659, 665, 669 (2006). 
34 See id. at 674 (observing that no companies from the 1950s through the 
early 1980s engaged in DTC mass marketing of pharmaceuticals). 
35 According to the learned intermediary doctrine, “the physician is ‘best 
situated to weigh the risks and benefits’ associated with a drug in relation to 
the needs of the patient.” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. 
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 As the FDA notes, DTC advertising was never prohibited 
by federal law.36 Nonetheless, it was only in the 1980s that 
pharmaceutical companies began DTC advertising in the U.S.37
Because, for many years, pharmaceutical companies promoted their 
products solely to qualifying healthcare professionals, it isn’t sur-
prising that marketing practices over most of the 20th century 
developed primarily around physicians.38
 What follows is an in-depth examination and assessment 
of two pharmaceutical company marketing practices that target 
physicians: company funding of and influence on the continuing 
medical education (CME) seminars and conferences of third-party 
professional organizations,39 and company hosting of their own 
speaker programs.40 These practices are analyzed in terms of 
conflict of interest concerns.41 The analysis suggests that some 
current practices are beneficial and ethically manageable,42
whereas others provide insufficient social benefit while creating 
unmanageable and therefore unacceptable moral perils.43 The 
Article makes recommendations to address these issues. 
 Parts I and II explore the guidelines of the two key profes-
sional/industry groups on the relationship between drug companies 
Litig., 286 F. Supp. 3d 667, 671 (2017) (quoting Fisher v. Pro. Compounding 
Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1020 (D. Nev. 2004)). 
36 Background on Drug Advertising, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Re 
sourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/ucm071964.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/AB8R-7CED] (last updated June 19, 2015). 
37 Id. (“Until the mid-1980s, drug companies gave information about pre-
scription drugs only to doctors and pharmacists. When these professionals 
thought it appropriate, they gave that information to their patients. However, 
during the 1980s, some drug companies started to give the general public more 
direct access to this information through DTC ads.”). 
38 Donohue, supra note 33, at 669. 
39 See infra Section III.A. 
40 See infra Section III.B. 
41 For a broad background discussion of conflict of interest in the medical 
profession, see generally INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE (Bernard Lo & 
Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009). 
42 I refer here specifically to whether conflicts of interest can be justified 
due to social benefits. See infra Section III.A. Some conflicts of interest are 
avoidable or are acceptably manageable in order to achieve otherwise desira-
ble ends. 
43 See infra Section III.B. 
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and medical practitioners. Specifically, Part I explores the Ameri-
can Medical Association (AMA) Code that governs physicians, 
and Part II examines the Pharmaceutical Research and Manu-
facturers of America (PhRMA) Code that governs the drug com-
panies. Part III examines conflict of interest concerns raised by 
the relationships between these two groups. The last Part provides 
recommendations and concluding remarks. 
I. THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CODE OF 
MEDICAL ETHICS OPINION 9
 The medical profession has addressed the relationship be-
tween doctors and drug companies through its umbrella profes-
sional organization, the American Medical Association (AMA).44
The AMA Code of Medical Ethics (AMA Code) was originally 
drafted in 1847 and has been amended haphazardly over the 
course of 169 years.45 It was systematically revised only twice: 
first half a century ago and then more recently in 2016.46
 This Section looks at two relevant parts of the 2016 version 
that is currently in effect: Opinion 9.6.247 and Opinion 9.2.7.48 This 
Article refers periodically as well to an important Opinion from the 
previous version of the AMA Code, which was called Opinion 
8.061.49 As a reminder of the status of each Opinion discussed 
herein, this Article refers to them throughout as “Current” to 
denote the AMA Code presently in effect,50 and “Previous” to de-
note the AMA Code that was replaced by the 2016 revisions.51
44 See AMA’s Leadership in Medical Ethics Guides Teachers and Learners 
in Medicine, AM. MED. ASS’N (Jan. 15, 2014), https://www.ama-assn.org/de 
livering-care/ethics/amas-leadership-medical-ethics-guides-teachers-and-learn 
ers-medicine [https://perma.cc/GR55-HDN7]. 
45 See Code of Medical Ethics Modernized for First Time in 50 years, AM.
MED. ASS’N (June 14, 2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/about/publications-news 
letters/code-medical-ethics-modernized-first-time-50-years [https://perma.cc 
/37L2-UYZ3] [hereinafter Code Modernized]. 
46 Id.
47 Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Med. Ethics, Opinion 9.6.2 (2016). 
48 Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Med. Ethics, Opinion 9.2.7 ( 2016). 
49 See Opinion 8.061—Gift to Physicians from Industry, 16 AM. MED. ASS’N
J. MED. ETHICS 261 (2014), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2014/04/coet2 
-1404.html [https://perma.cc/BDE4-65FZ] [hereinafter Opinion 8.061]. 
50 See generally Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Med. Ethics, Opinions 9 (2016). 
51 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
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A. Current Opinion 9.6.2 
 Current Opinion 9.6.2 regarding gifts to physicians from 
industry observes that “[r]elationships among physicians and 
professional medical organizations and pharmaceutical, biotech-
nology, and medical device companies help drive innovation in 
patient care and contribute to the economic well-being of the 
community to the ultimate benefit of patients and the public.”52
 This reasonable statement improves on a more troubling 
assertion that was in Previous Opinion 8.061, which extended 
beyond relationships to actual gifts,53 and stated that “[m]any 
gifts given to physicians by companies in the pharmaceutical, 
device, and medical equipment industries serve an important 
and socially beneficial function.”54 The validity of this assertion 
was, on its face, suspect,55 so it’s good that the AMA replaced it 
with more measured and accurate language.56 After all, what is 
there that drug companies can give to doctors that they cannot 
buy themselves, or get elsewhere, without taint of favor or in-
debtedness? One commentator describes the situation: 
[P]atients are unaware of industry marketing practices that 
create conflicts of interest for doctors. Drug companies spon-
sor and publish shoddy research and present it to doctors at 
free educational programs, often hosted at fashionable resorts 
with complimentary gourmet meals and rounds of golf. They 
pay doctors to attend and to present the marketing programs. 
They also pay doctors to prescribe their drugs under the guise 
of “research” which is scientifically worthless. They shower doc-
tors with gifts and free samples to encourage prescribing. The 
strategy works. According to studies reported in the Journal 
52 See Opinion 9.6.2, supra note 47. 
53 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
54 Id.
55 See id. The suspect part of this earlier version’s introductory assertion is 
its questionable assumption that gifts are important and beneficial in main-
taining what are otherwise useful relationships between industry and doctors. 
See Elaine K. Howley, Do Drug Company Payments to Doctors Influence Which 
Drugs They Prescribe?, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 31, 2018), https://health.usnews.com 
/health-care/patient-advice/articles/2018-08-31/do-drug-company-payments-to 
-doctors-influence-which-drugs-they-prescribe (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (ex-
plaining that the actual impact of gift-giving “is still an active area of research”). 
56 See generally Code Modernized, supra note 45. 
34 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:023 
of the American Medical Association, in response to drug 
company promotions doctors prescribe drugs more frequently 
and nonrationally.57
 Previous Opinion 8.061 posited only one example of a “so-
cially beneficial function” of gifts to practitioners: the fact that 
“companies have long provided funds for educational seminars 
and conferences.”58 Certainly, educational seminars and conferences 
for physicians do have social value, assuming that the information 
provided in the programs is both objective and accurate.59 How-
ever, Previous Opinion 8.061 provided only this single example, 
probably because other types of gifts to physicians are difficult 
to justify and support.60
Ceteris paribus, a broad range of high-quality seminars 
and conferences for doctors, prescribing physician assistants (PAs), 
and nurse practitioners, is a good thing.61 Multiple seminar offer-
ings give medical professionals choices, increasing the chance they 
will get knowledge and information that will improve patient care.62
More seminars and conferences may enhance attendance by 
helping match educational offerings to practitioners’ calendars, 
schedules, geographic areas, and specific subject matter needs. 
 Funding these events also is likely to increase attendance 
simply by virtue of the personal economics that drives decision-
making generally.63 As practitioners weigh a variety of ways to 
57 Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-
Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 970 (2007). 
58 Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
59 See Sundeep Mishra, Editorial, Do Medical Conferences Have a Role to 
Play? Sharpen the Saw, 68 INDIAN HEART J. 111 (2016). Logic tells us that 
this is a big and perhaps unjustified assumption, given the conflicts of inter-
est discussed in detail later in this Article. See also infra Part III.
60 Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
61 See Mishra, supra note 59, at 111. 
62 There is a relationship between provision of choices and engagement of 
learners. See generally Frieda Parker et al., To Engage Students, Give Them 
Meaningful Choices in the Classroom, 99 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 37 (2017). 
63 See Jeffrey A. Tabas et al., Clinician Attitudes About Commercial Sup-
port of Continuing Medical Education, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 840, 
840, 843 (2011) (survey found less than half were willing to pay increased 
registration fees to decrease or eliminate commercial support. In addition, 77% of 
physicians said the cost of registration is an important factor in their decision 
about which accredited continuing medical education activity to select.). 
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spend their time and money, financial support provided by any-
one—including pharmaceutical companies—naturally makes 
seminars and conferences more affordable and appealing to po-
tential attendees.64
 Industry funding of conferences and seminars does raise 
conflict of interest concerns.65 While most readers will already be 
familiar with the concept of conflict of interest as a legal and 
ethical issue, it may be helpful to define conflict of interest. Lo 
suggests that conflicts of interest exist under “circumstances that 
create ‘a risk that professional judgment or actions regarding a 
primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary inter-
est.’”66 In regard to physicians, Thompson states that “[a] conflict 
of interest is a set of conditions in which professional judgment 
concerning a primary interest (such as a patient’s welfare or the 
validity of research) tends to be unduly influenced by a second-
ary interest (such as financial gain).”67
 Primary interests are the socially sanctioned, intended, 
desired goals of a drug company or a medical practitioner, and 
Lo agrees with Thompson that the welfare of patients should 
logically be a key primary interest of doctors.68 Lo offers a more 
expansive list of doctors’ secondary interests, including “financial 
gain, ... prestige, professional recognition, intellectual commit-
ments to an idea or approach, and favors to friends, colleagues, 
or relatives.”69
 For pharmaceutical companies, financial gain is likely to be 
either the primary interest or the logical main secondary inter-
est.70 Whichever is the case, if financial gain or other self-serving 
64 See id. at 840, 843. 
65 See infra Part III. 
66 Bernard Lo, The Future of Conflicts of Interest: A Call for Professional 
Standards, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 441, 443 (2012) (internal quotation omitted). 
67 Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 573 (1993). 
68 Lo posits “the well-being of patients” as a primary interest of doctors. 
See Lo, supra note 66, at 443; see also Thompson, supra note 67, at 573. 
69 Lo, supra note 66, at 443. 
70 Whether profit is the primary interest of pharmaceutical companies or a 
secondary interest depends on one’s philosophy of what is the predominant 
social responsibility of business. Milton Friedman’s classic stance is that the 
“social responsibility of business ... [is] to increase its profits.” Milton Friedman, 
The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
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benefits might undermine patient treatment decisions, we should 
be concerned.71
B. Current Opinion 9.2.7 
 Current Opinion 9.2.7 addresses physicians’ financial re-
lationships with industry in continuing medical education.72 It 
begins, appropriately, by recognizing and stating the risk: 
Financial or in-kind support from pharmaceutical, biotechnol-
ogy or medical device companies that have a direct interest in 
physicians’ recommendations creates conditions in which ex-
ternal interests could influence the availability and/or content 
of continuing medical education (CME). Financial relation-
ships between such sources and individual physicians who or-
ganize CME, teach in CME, or have other roles in continuing 
professional education can carry similar potential to influence 
CME in undesired ways.73
The Current Version then states that, when possible, CME 
funding and staffing should come from independent sources that 
do not have a financial relationship with either the industry or 
the educational subject matter: 
CME that is independent of funding or in-kind support from 
sources that have financial interests in physicians’ recommenda-
tions promotes confidence in the independence and integrity of 
professional education, as does CME in which organizers, teach-
ers, and others involved in educating physicians do not have 
36 (Sept. 13, 1970). This approach suggests that profit is the primary objective of 
all business entities. See id. Conversely, applying a stakeholder model, “a va-
riety of other interests [besides shareholder profit] are considered such as 
employees, suppliers, environmental, social and other interests.” Joel Slawotsky, 
The Virtues of Shareholder Value Driven Activism: Avoiding Governance Pitfalls,
12 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 521, 521 (2016). The social interest of public health can 
arguably lead us to conclude that, under a stakeholder model, patient safety 
should be the primary interest of pharmaceutical companies, with profit com-
ing in as secondary. See generally id. 
71 David J. Rothman, Medical Professionalism—Focusing on the Real Issues,
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1284, 1284 (2000) (mentioning overtreatment of pa-
tients, self-referral, and fee splitting). 
72 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48. 
73 Id.
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financial relationships with industry that could influence their 
participation. When possible, CME should be provided without 
such support or the participation of individuals who have fi-
nancial interests in the educational subject matter.74
 As this “when possible” language implies, the Current 
Opinion 9.2.7 suggests that at times, CME cannot avoid finan-
cial conflicts of interest.75 It states, “In some circumstances, 
support from industry or participation by individuals who have 
financial interests in the subject matter may be needed to enable 
access to appropriate, high-quality CME.”76 It then enumerates 
a variety of steps that should be taken when financial conflicts 
of interest cannot be avoided.77 These include disclosing any fi-
nancial relationships that might influence educational activities, 
the sources and nature of any commercial support and financial 
relationships, and any steps taken to mitigate influence of finan-
cial relationships.78 In addition, the Current Opinion outlines a 
variety of mechanisms that should be undertaken to protect the 
independence of educational activities.79
 Previous Opinion 8.061 has two simple instructions for 
managing conflicts of interest when companies subsidize confer-
ences and professional meetings.80 First, it attempted to manage 
any conflict of interest of such funding by requiring that company 
subsidies benefit practitioners only indirectly.81 Section 4 of Pre-
vious Opinion 8.061 thus stated: 
Subsidies to underwrite the costs of continuing medical education 
conferences or professional meetings can contribute to the im-
provement of patient care and therefore are permissible. Since 
the giving of a subsidy directly to a physician by a company’s 
representative may create a relationship that could influence the 
use of the company’s products, any subsidy should be accepted 







80 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
81 Id.
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reduce the conference’s registration fee. Payments to defray the 
costs of a conference should not be accepted directly from the 
company by the physicians attending the conference.82
 Secondly, Previous Opinion 8.601 also required that pharma-
ceutical companies funding the conferences or lectures of various 
medical organizations not directly influence the content.83 Item 7 
stated, “when companies underwrite medical conferences or lec-
tures other than their own, responsibility for and control over the 
selection of content, faculty, educational methods, and materials 
should belong to the organizers of the conferences or lectures.”84
 Item 7 of the Previous Version thus recognized that in-
dustry control of content is problematic, and prohibited outright 
any content control by company sponsors.85 It is important to 
note that this restriction was limited to situations where com-
panies are underwriting conferences and lectures “other than 
their own.”86 As we shall see, this left the door open for compa-
nies to influence and skew content through the provision of their 
own speaker programs aimed at invited groups of physicians, and 
using handsomely paid practitioner-speakers as the presenters.87
 While the revised AMA Code regrettably still does not in-
clude these two specific restrictions that were in the Previous 
Version, the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Code of Ethics does rep-
licate both of them in the standards it lays out for the drug com-
panies.88 Unfortunately, this still leaves physicians free, under their 
own code of ethics, to accept direct compensation for attending 
CME events, or to turn a blind eye to improper industry influence 
over CME content, in cases where a drug company might violate 






87 See infra Section III.B. 
88 Compare Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48, and supra text accompanying 
notes 73–74, with Opinion 8.061, supra note 49, and infra text accompanying 
notes 100–02.
89 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48. 
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II. THE PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS 
OF AMERICA CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH 
HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS
 Just as the AMA has its Code of Ethics for doctors, so the 
drug industry has established its own code to govern pharma-
ceutical marketing practices.90 While the AMA is concerned with 
the ethics of medical practitioners,91 the Pharmaceutical Research 
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) addresses ethical issues 
facing drug companies.92
 The PhRMA first introduced what is now called its Code
on Interactions with Health Care Professionals (PhRMA Code) in 
2002, under the name PhRMA Voluntary Code of Marketing 
Practices.93 The PhRMA Code was revised effective January 
2009,94 and again effective January 2020.95 Unsurprisingly, like the 
AMA Code, the PhRMA Code takes the position that there are bene-
fits to current pharmaceutical industry promotional practices.96
 Specifically, the Preamble of the current PhRMA Code 
notes, “Ethical relationships with health care professionals are 
critical to our mission of helping patients by developing and market-
ing new medicines. An important part of achieving this mission 
is ensuring that healthcare professionals have the latest, most ac-
curate information available regarding prescription medicines, 
90 PhRMA Voluntary Code of Marketing Practices, RELIAS MEDIA (Nov. 1, 
2002), https://www.reliasmedia.com/articles/110376-phrma-voluntary-code-on 
-marketing-practices [https://perma.cc/P3Q8-AQ86]. 
91 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48. 
92 As of August 19, 2018, the PhRMA’s web page lists the organization’s 
mission as follows: “Our mission is to conduct effective advocacy for public 
policies that encourage the discovery of important, new medicines for pa-
tients by biopharmaceutical research companies. To accomplish this mission, 
we are dedicated to achieving these goals in Washington, D.C. and across the 
country.” Our Mission, PHARM. RSCH. & MFRS. AM., https://www.phrma.org 
/about/our-mission [https://perma.cc/DJ6M-BK5P]. 
93 PhRMA Voluntary Code of Marketing Practices, supra note 90. 
94 PHARM. RSCH. & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH 
CARE PROS. 3 (2009), https://www.acpe-accredit.org/pdf/Code%20on%20Interac 
tions%20HC%20Professionals.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HND-CKRG]. 
95 PHARM. RSCH. & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTH 
CARE PROS. 3 (2020), https://www.phrma.org/-/media/Project/PhRMA/PhRMA 
-Org/PhRMA-Org/PDF/A-C/Code-of-Interaction_FINAL21.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/33LF-44CH] [hereinafter PHARMA 2020 CODE].
96 Id. at 2; see also Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
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which play an ever-increasing role in patient healthcare.”97 This in-
itial statement focuses on drug companies’ role in education and 
information provision to healthcare professionals.98
 The Preamble then elaborates in a set of bullet points that 
frame the industry’s relationship and educational role with health-
care professionals as “critical” to meeting four goals: to “inform 
health care professionals about the benefits and risks of our 
products to help advance appropriate patient use, provide scien-
tific and educational information, support medical research and 
education, and obtain feedback and advice about our products 
through consultation with medical experts.”99
 Section 4 of the PhRMA Code maintains the two important 
restrictions that were contained in the previous version of the 
AMA Code,100 but which are missing in the current version.101
Under the PhRMA Code, company support of CME conferences 
and seminars is required to be indirect—i.e., to the conference 
providers in order to reduce registration fees for all—rather 
than directly paid to attendees; and companies are not permit-
ted to select “content, faculty, educational methods, materials 
and venue,” but must leave these selections up to the conference 
organizers “in accordance with their guidelines.”102
 Section 7 of the PhRMA Code covers pharmaceutical com-
pany speaker programs that ostensibly help serve the educational 
role.103 It notes: 
Company decisions regarding the selection or retention of health 
care professionals as speakers should be made based on defined 
criteria such as general medical expertise and reputation, 
knowledge and experience regarding a particular therapeutic 
area, and communication skills. Companies should continue 
to ensure that speaking arrangements are neither induce-
ments nor rewards for prescribing a particular medicine or 
course of treatment.104
97 PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 2. 
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
101 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48. 
102 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 6. 
103 See id. at 9. 
104 Id.
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 While this is a nice general edict, it is a requirement that 
eludes any kind of conceivable monitoring. We can never get into 
the mind of a sales representative or manager to know whether 
they select and retain speakers based on expertise and reputation. 
Similarly, we can never know if speaking arrangements are being 
used as inducements or rewards. Let’s not be naïve: sales managers 
and representatives under pressure to meet goals will inevitably vi-
olate these rules, 105 and the violation is undetectable because we can 
never know the state of mind of the person who selects the speakers. 
 Recall also that the Preamble to the PhRMA Code states 
that the current relationship between drug companies and doc-
tors is “critical.”106 Are gifts, gratuities, and benefits from indus-
try to doctors also critical to accomplish important goals, or are 
they achievable in other ways? If they can be achieved by other 
means, should the goals noted in the Preamble107 be accomplished 
through the touted industry-practitioner relationship, or through 
alternative means?
Because the four PhRMA Code Preamble goals108 have 
some redundancy, this Article consolidates them for assessment 
purposes into three discrete categories: informing and educating 
healthcare professionals, supporting medical research, and ob-
taining feedback about products from medical experts.109 The
following Subsections explore and evaluate each of these justifi-
cations for the relationship between companies and doctors.
A. Informing and Educating Healthcare Professionals as a  
Rationale for Relationships with Physicians 
 Pharmaceutical company funded events can be educa-
tional, and the companies have knowledge and information 
105 See, e.g., Radha Chitale, Pfizer Pays $2.3B, But Will It Change the Pharma-
ceutical Industry?, ABC NEWS (Sept. 2, 2009, 6:31 PM), https://abcnews.go 
.com/Health/PainManagement/pfizers-23-billion-settlement-change-practices 
/story?id=8476391 [https://perma.cc/GTX8-7UZN] (“At Pfizer, I was expected 
to increase profits at all costs ....”). 
106 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 2. 
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 This consolidation combines “inform[ing] health care professionals about the 
benefits and risks of our products to help advance appropriate patient use,” with 
“provid[ing] scientific and educational information,” as it is difficult to distinguish 
the crux of these two justifications. Id. They are both education functions. Id.
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about treatment of the conditions they research.110 Pharmaceu-
tical company expenditures on research and development have 
soared over the past few years, rising steadily from $48.6 billion in 
2011 to $71.4 billion in 2017.111 This investment gives drug com-
panies a wealth of information to impart to medical practitioners.112
 Educating doctors about treatments is, of course, im-
portant.113 That said, are drug companies the entities we should 
entrust with accurately and objectively achieving this educa-
tional function? Levy, from the National Pharmaceutical Council 
Inc., supports the educational role of pharmaceutical marketing, 
stating, “Pharmaceutical marketing is the last element of an in-
formation continuum, where research concepts are transformed 
into practical therapeutic tools and where information is pro-
gressively layered and made more useful to the health care system. 
Thus, transfer of information to physicians through marketing is 
a crucial element of pharmaceutical innovation.”114 Arguably, in 
the absence of drug marketing, “few physicians and patients would 
become aware of a new drug, and, thus, few patients would ob-
tain its benefits.”115
However, drug companies have a fundamental conflict of in-
terest as they seek billions of dollars in potential profits.116 This 
110 For discussion of roles of medical information in the pharmaceutical indus-
try, see Sukhpreet & P. Tiwari, Role of Medicine Information in Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 68 INDIAN J. PHARM. SCIS. 801, 802 (2006). 
111 Matej Mikulic, Research and Development Expenditure of Total U.S. 
Pharmaceutical Industry from 1995 to 2018, STATISTA (Mar. 9, 2020), https://
www.statista.com/statistics/265085/research-and-development-expenditure-us 
-pharmaceutical-industry/ [https://perma.cc/BJT2-L29P]. 
112 See Sukhpreet & Tiwari, supra note 110, at 801. 
113 See id. at 802. 
114 Richard Levy, The Role and Value of Pharmaceutical Marketing, 3 
ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 327, 327 (1994). 
115 Richard A. Epstein, Overdose: How Excessive Government Regulation 
Stifles Pharmaceutical Innovation, 297 JAMA 646, 646 (2007) (book review). 
116 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-40, DRUG INDUSTRY:
PROFITS, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SPENDING, AND MERGER AND ACQUI-
SITION DEALS (2017), https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-40 [https://perma 
.cc/UL9A-XBNF] [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (estimating that pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology sales revenue increased from $534 billion to $775 billion 
from 2006 to 2015 and that the largest 25 companies achieved annual aver-
age profit margins between 15 and 20 percent). Although pharmaceutical 
companies have the knowledge and information to educate doctors, their mo-
tivation is fundamentally compromised. See Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The 
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conflict justifies skepticism about an educational function of phar-
maceutical marketing.117 Fortunately, in any business, some 
players will have strong ethical principles.118 Unfortunately, oth-
ers may gladly skew medical information, engage in deceptive 
behavior, or otherwise cut corners in maintaining an objective 
educational role, in order to grow sales and profits.119
 The stakes are high when pharmaceutical companies are 
tempted and permitted to place profit-seeking over ethics in their 
purportedly educational practices.120 No example is more compel-
ling than the present, pernicious opioid crisis.121 Sarpatwari et al. 
Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 463, 472–73 (2017). The primary driver of these companies—like all 
companies—is not education. It is profit. Id. Pharmaceutical company execu-
tives and scientists work for a business, and businesses have the charge of 
making money. High R&D costs, combined with finite timeframes for patent-
ed products, put enormous financial pressure on drug companies to sell their 
products. See GAO REPORT, supra note 116, at 4–5, 7. Profit orientation, ag-
gressive sales expectations, and incentive structures encourage companies to 
pass these substantial pressures on to employees. See Sarpatwari et al., supra
note 116, at 467. 
117 For example, one study found pharmaceutical advertising to go beyond 
awareness-raising, seeking to “persuade through presentation of research 
findings.” David R. Gutknecht, Evidence-Based Advertising? A Survey of Four 
Major Journals, 14 J. AM. BD. FAM. PRAC. 197, 199–200 (2001). The finding 
suggested that “[d]escriptions of research in pharmaceutical advertisements 
were brief and incomplete, and they inconsistently provided the basic design 
and statistical information needed to judge the results reported.” Id. at 197. 
118 See generally Melissa Horton, The Importance of Business Ethics,
INVESTOPEDIA (July 1, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040 
815/why-are-business-ethics-important.asp [https://perma.cc/DL6X-TCL8] (dis-
cussing the incentives that players in business industries have to be ethical). 
119 For an example discussing misleading information in drug marketing, 
see Adrienne E. Faerber & David H. Kreling, Content Analysis of False and 
Misleading Claims in Television Advertising for Prescription and Nonprescrip-
tion Drugs, 29 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 110 (2013). 
120 See Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis [https:// 
perma.cc/B22N-9RTP]. 
121 The National Institute on Drug Abuse refers to the present situation as 
an “opioid overdose crisis.” See id.
The misuse of and addiction to opioids—including prescrip-
tion pain relievers, heroin, and synthetic opioids such as fen-
tanyl—is a serious national crisis that affects public health as 
well as social and economic welfare. The Centers for Disease 
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list “fraudulent marketing” as one of four problems that have ex-
acerbated the opioid epidemic.122 They note that “to boost profits, 
pharmaceutical companies have often engaged in false or mis-
leading marketing. Over the past twenty-five years, the industry 
has paid $35.7 billion to settle claims of illegal marketing, in-
cluding making false or misleading claims or failing to disclose 
known risks.”123
 Ho & Rovzar describe one company’s marketing of a pre-
scription opioid: “Through aggressive advertising and marketing 
efforts, the company conducted more than forty national confer-
ences from 1996 through 2001, through which it endorsed liberal 
prescription of opioids ....”124 They further note that in 2001, the 
company’s sales representatives received average sales bonuses 
of $71,500.125
 Not all entities and actors will manage the conflict of in-
terest with integrity and place ethics ahead of self-interest.126
Are there, then, better societal players to engage in the role of 
education of healthcare providers than drug companies? Arguably, 
academic scientists are better positioned to play this role.127 In 
addition to pharmaceutical company scientists, government grant-
funded scientists working at universities are the other main group 
that do research on pharmaceutical products.128
Control and Prevention estimates that the total “economic bur-
den” of prescription opioid misuse alone in the United States is 
$78.5 billion a year, including the costs of healthcare, lost produc-
tivity, addiction treatment, and criminal justice involvement. 
Id.
122 See Sarpatwari et al., supra note 116, at 480. 
123 Id.
124 Jeremiah A. Ho & Alexander O. Rovzar, Preventing Neonatal Abstinence 
Syndrome Within the Opioid Epidemic: A Uniform Facilitative Policy, 54 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 423, 437 (2017). 
125 Id.
126 For discussion of conflict of interest challenges, see Pilar N. Ossorio, 
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Legal and Ethical Issues, 8 WIDENER L.
SYMP. J. 75 (2001). 
127 See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices That Create 
Conflicts of Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 50 SURV.
ANESTHESIOLOGY 282, 282 (2006). 
128 See INST. OF MED., F. ON DRUG DISCOVERY, DEV., AND TRANSLATION,
BREAKTHROUGH BUSINESS MODELS: DRUG DEVELOPMENT FOR RARE AND NE-
GLECTED DISEASES AND INDIVIDUALIZED THERAPIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 2 
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 Of course, academic scientists employed by universities are 
also subject to both institutional pressures and conflicts of inter-
est.129 As Taylor observes, “Conflicts of interest are ubiquitous 
and inevitable in academic life, indeed, in all professional life. The 
challenge for academic medicine is not to eradicate them, which 
is fanciful and would be inimical to public policy goals, but to 
recognize and manage them sensibly and effectively.”130
 The most direct of these pressures can come from industry 
itself when academic scientists receive either benefits from a com-
pany or direct industry funding for their research.131 In these sit-
uations, the potential conflict of interest is an attenuated version of 
the conflict faced by company-employed scientists.132 The latter 
group faces greater pressures because their stakes are higher—their 
livelihood depends on the company’s willingness to continue their 
employment.133 In other words, the job security of a scientist em-
ployed by a drug company logically exerts a greater pressure than a 
single project funded by the company to a university, whose fac-
ulty’s base salaries are paid by the employing university.134
 Academic scientists can, of course, be subjected to other 
pressures as well.135 If a pharmaceutical company has been a 
(2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK50977/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK50977 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/49XF-NHVF] (noting that drug development is a combined 
effort of not only drug companies, but also government-funded organizations). 
129 See Ossorio, supra note 126, at 75. 
130 Patrick L. Taylor, Innovation Incentives or Corrupt Conflicts of Interest? 
Moving Beyond Jekyll and Hyde in Regulating Biomedical Academic-Industry 
Relationships, 13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 135, 142 (2013) (quoting 
David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 284 JAMA 2234, 
2234 (2000)). 
131 See Paul M. Ridker & Jose Torres, Reported Outcomes in Major Cardio-
vascular Clinical Trials Funded by For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Organizations: 
2000–2005, 295 JAMA 2270, 2270 (2006) (reporting findings that “[clinical] trials 
funded by for-profit organizations were more likely to report positive findings 
than those funded by not-for-profit organizations”). 
132 Sheldon Krimsky, Do Financial Conflicts of Interest Bias Research? An 
Inquiry into the “Funding Effect” Hypothesis, 38 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 
566, 577 (2012). 
133 Compare id., with Mildred K. Cho et al., Policies on Faculty Conflicts of 
Interest at US Universities, 284 JAMA 2203 (2000). 
134 Compare Krimsky, supra note 132, at 577, with Cho et al., supra note 
133, at 284. 
135 See Marjorie Valbrun, Letting the Donor Decide, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 8, 
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/08/professors-question  
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donor to the university that employs a scientist, administrators 
who consider that funding relationship important might exert 
pressures on the scientist to support the relationship.136 If this 
becomes inappropriate pressure to report company-friendly re-
sults, scientists at universities may be subject to influences other 
than pristine research methodology.137
 We hope that core values of the academy—objectivity and 
the quest for truth138—are powerful drivers of disinterested re-
search. Given that a fundamental goal of academic research is the 
quest for a true, objective understanding of the world, university 
researchers are well-positioned to provide practitioners with re-
liable information.139
 Pressures on research faculty to report donor company-
friendly results are nonetheless concerning.140 Theoretically, any 
support from industry to universities—either general support or 
support of research—should have no strings.141 Yet to assume that 
this ideal consistently reflects reality is naïve.142 Indeed, there is an 
axiom among university development professionals that there is no 
such thing as corporate philanthropy—when companies give, 
they expect to get some direct or indirect benefit in return.143
-big-donation-saint-louis-university-because-conditions-attached [https://perma 
.cc/PL2Q-LD3T].
136 Maintaining research independence and integrity in the face of donor 
pressures is a compelling and thorny problem. See id. (“Record $50 million gift to 
Saint Louis University gave donors the right to help pick head of research 
institute and give that person a faculty title. Professors see dangerous erosion of 
academic values.”). While this kind of explicit quid pro quo agreement is likely 
uncommon and considered inappropriate and unacceptable, universities may 
naturally and unofficially defer to multimillion-dollar financial supporters to 
curry favor and encourage ongoing support. See id.
137 See Krimsky, supra note 132, at 576. 
138 See Michael J. Bolton & Gregory B. Stolcis, Ties That Do Not Bind: Musings 
on the Specious Relevance of Academic Research, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 626, 
627 (2003) (observing that “[a]cademics are trained to generate knowledge in 
their respective disciplines”). 
139 See Krimsky, supra note 132, at 567. 
140 For an example of research initiatives guided by donor objectives, see 
University Donations: No Strings Attached?, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. SUPP. (Jan. 3. 
2019), https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/university-donations-no 
-strings-attached [https://perma.cc/FX36-BJ5Z] [hereinafter University Donations].
141 For discussion of this issue, see generally id.
142 See Cho et al., supra note 133, at 2203. 
143 Companies that support research or provide ostensibly philanthropic 
support to a university often view these activities as investments. See Alaka
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 Industry influence on academic research can be divided into 
two scenarios. Scenario 1 exists when a company gives financial 
support to a university in one guise, and a professor is doing re-
search that is unrelated to that university support, but in which 
the company has a stake.144 An example would be when a phar-
maceutical company provides scholarship support for students, 
while a professor in the Chemistry department is simultaneously 
doing research that might affect the company.145
 Scenario 1 can create pressure, albeit attenuated.146 If a 
chemist gets called to the university president’s office to discuss 
how her research results might influence continued scholarship 
support, there is pressure—implicit, explicit, or both.147 This kind 
of pressure can affect research objectivity, and therefore creates 
ethical concerns.148 The pressure is attenuated, however, because 
on their faces, the scholarship and the research are separate ac-
tivities independent of one another, unless someone makes the 
connection and exerts pressure based on that connection.149
 Scenario 2 occurs where a pharmaceutical company is provid-
ing direct funding for a chemist’s research.150 If the company 
Malwade Basu, Are Millennium Development Goals Relevant for Academic 
Research?, 42 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 4235 (2007). Not surprisingly, given their 
mission to make profits, they are seeking some kind of business advantage. See
Cho et al., supra note 133, at 2203. They may seek access to universities’ talent 
pools for hiring or may be looking for relationships with faculty to reap the benefits 
of their knowledge and expertise. See id. They may seek influence of some kind—
potentially including influence over research results. See Basu, supra, at 4235. 
This last category of influence is the principle concern regarding whether 
universities can be objective in research that is funded by industry. See id.
144 See University Donations, supra note 140. 
145 See Valbrun, supra note 135. 
146 See University Donations, supra note 140. 
147 Basu notes that while research should not be politicized or improperly 
influenced, the current reality is that it is: 
The whole point of university affiliation is that the academic 
can be an independent researcher whose research interests 
and output are not dictated by university administrators, pol-
iticians or corporations. This is a mission that is already se-
verely eroded by what has been called the corporatization of 
the university and university research. 
See Basu, supra note 143, at 4235.
148 See University Donations, supra note 140. 
149 See id. 
150 For discussion of the “funding effect” correlating funding sources with 
study outcomes, see Krimsky, supra note 132, at 577. 
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places any pressure on the chemist to report favorable outcomes, 
that is unattenuated pressure since the company is directly at-
tempting to influence the findings of research it is financially 
supporting.151 Even if the company sponsoring research does not 
overtly communicate any pressure in regard to research outcomes, 
investigators might nonetheless infer or presume such pressure.152
 Scenario 2 likely creates the greater moral jeopardy for 
two reasons. First, in Scenario 1, we can and should hope that 
the university president will exert her own professional ethics, 
declining to intervene in any way that might influence the chem-
ist’s results. At the very least, a savvy president will recognize 
that such intervention creates an appearance of academic im-
propriety.153 Second, industry funding of faculty research under 
Scenario 2 exerts a pressure that is immediate.154 It creates a direct 
dependency on the part of the investigator that is potentially 
powerfully corrupting.155
 University research objectivity has been challenged as well 
by those suggesting a liberal bias in the academy.156 While political 
leanings do not necessarily imply political research bias, humans 
151 See id. 
152 See id. Faculty researchers are likely to be smart and savvy enough to 
recognize that an industry sponsor has interests in the outcome of their re-
search, and that faculty whose results are favorable to a company are more 
likely to receive future funding than faculty whose conclusions are unfavora-
ble to the company. See id. Even if a company places no express pressure on 
faculty to arrive at desired conclusions, faculty can infer that there are poten-
tial stakes in the direction of their findings. See id.
153 See Basu, supra note 143, at 4235. 
154 See Krimsky, supra note 132, at 577. 
155 See Cho et al., supra note 133, at 2203–04. 
There is a growing body of literature showing that faculty 
who have industry ties are more likely to report research re-
sults that are favorable to a corporate sponsor, are more likely 
to conduct research that is of lower quality, and are less likely 
to disseminate their results to the scientific community. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
156 See, e.g., Robert Maranto & Matthew Woessner, Diversifying the Acad-
emy: How Conservative Academics Can Thrive in Liberal America, 45 PS: POL. SCI.
& POL. 469 (2012) (discussing the domination of higher education by politically lib-
eral faculty and suggesting strategies for conservative faculty to avoid unnec-
essary conflict and thrive). 
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are subject to unconscious bias generally,157 and concern has been 
raised about possible political bias bleeding over into research.158
 Recent data suggest that “[a]cademics, on average, lean to 
the left.”159 In 2010–2011, survey results showed 62.7 percent of 
full-time faculty at four-year colleges and universities identifying 
as either far-left or liberal,160 while only 11.9 percent identified 
as far-right or conservative.161
 Ideological biases among the professoriate could affect re-
search projects funded through grants.162 The peer review pro-
cess in a liberally slanted academy may tend to favor both grant 
proposals and refereed article submissions that appear to have 
liberal leanings.163
 If so, this can be a confounding influence on how well uni-
versities achieve the ideal of impartial, objective research.164 In 
the arena of pharmaceutical research, political biases could be a 
157 For a sampling of discussions of unconscious bias in a variety of con-
texts, see Philip E. Tetlock et al., Detecting and Punishing Unconscious Bias,
42 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 84 (2013); Jean Moule, Understanding Unconscious Bi-
as and Unintentional Racism, 90 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 320, 321 (2009); see also 
Jeffrey Mervis, U.S. Study Shows Unconscious Gender Bias in Academic Sci-
ence, 337 SCI. MAG. 1592 (2012). 
158 See Robert J. MacCoun & Susannah Paletz, Citizens’ Perceptions of 
Ideological Bias in Research on Public Policy Controversies, 30 POL. PSYCH. 43
(2009) (discussing ideological bias in research and finding that persons with 
conservative beliefs tend to attribute studies with liberal findings to the re-
searcher’s own political leaning). 





162 See Marc T. Law et al., Earmarked: The Political Economy of Agricultural 
Research Appropriations, 30 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 194 (2008) (exploring political 
influence over allocation of research funds); Carol J. Lee, Commensuration 
Bias in Peer Review, 82 PHIL. SCI. 1272 (2015) (observing that reviewers’ sys-
tematic prioritization among various review criteria problematically influ-
ences publication and funding decisions). 
163 See Maranto & Woessner, supra note 156, at 470. 
164 For discussion of the risks of politicization of research and findings in 
universities, see Hannah Forsyth, Disinterested Scholars or Interested Par-
ties? The Public’s Investment in Self-Interested Universities, in THROUGH A
GLASS DARKLY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCES LOOK AT THE NEOLIBERAL UNIVERSITY,
19 (Margaret Thornton ed., 2015). 
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concern, as liberal and conservative positions may vary in re-
gard to the value of particular drugs, medical interventions, and 
policies around them.165
 Despite the conflicts of interest that faculty face, universi-
ties are a better resource than companies for objectively educat-
ing and informing practitioners about drug treatments.166 There 
is an inherent, fundamental difference between the mission of a 
company and the mission of a university.167 Companies exist 
primarily to make profits,168 whereas universities exist primarily 
to create and disseminate knowledge.169
165 This could be true, for example, in regard to research concerning drugs 
being explored as potential interventions to terminate pregnancy. For a dis-
cussion of the difficulty in establishing scientific objectivity in abortion-linked 
breast cancer research and the political controversy surrounding the issue, 
see Patricia Jasen, Breast Cancer and the Politics of Abortion in the United 
States, 49 MED. HIST., 423, 423–44 (2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc 
/articles/PMC1251638/ [http://perma.cc/LYQ2-KSJX]. 
166 See Brennan et al., supra note 127, at 282. 
167 See Margaret Thornton, Introduction: The Retreat from the Critical, in
THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY: THE SOCIAL SCIENCES LOOK AT THE NEOLIBERAL 
UNIVERSITY, 3 (Margaret Thornton ed., 2015). 
168 This mission doesn’t necessarily imply a duty to maximize profits at 
any cost. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Inter-
est, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005). Management has discretion under the 
business judgment rule to consider tradeoffs between lawfully maximizing 
corporate profits and serving the public interest. See id. (“Corporate managers 
have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize corporate profits. Rather, 
they have always had some legal discretion (implicit or explicit) to sacrifice cor-
porate profits in the public interest.”). The very discussion of whether corpo-
rate managers have any discretion ever to put public interest ahead of profits 
highlights how central the profit mission is to company endeavors. The busi-
ness judgment rule is the exception that proves the more overarching rule: the 
primary role of companies is to make money. See id. at 736. Indeed, the case widely 
viewed as a primary source of the business judgment rule itself asserts share-
holder primacy, the notion that “[a] business corporation is organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
169 In other words, the most central core value of a business is to sell its 
products. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. at 684. In contrast, the core values of ac-
ademic research are knowledge and truth. See Lisa D. Ordóñez et al., On Good 
Scholarship, Goal Setting, and Scholars Gone Wild, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPS.
82, 84 (2009). At least in their pristine forms, one is fundamentally partisan, 
whereas the other is intended to be impartial. See id. at 84–85. 
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 Although people in any organization can be tempted to-
ward unethical behavior, profit-seeking is likely to exert stronger 
pressures than knowledge seeking.170 The sales goals of pharmaceu-
tical company employees demand that they place their own 
products in the best possible light.171 In contrast, the research goals 
of scholars are, at least in their pristine form, manifestly aimed at 
the pure and objective discovery of truth and knowledge.172 More-
over, tenure provides significant protection of academic freedom, 
so that tenured university faculty are uniquely insulated from 
pressures regarding their research, at least in terms of their basic 
job security.173
 For these reasons, information provided to doctors about 
drug treatments is likely to be more objective when coming from 
academic researchers than when coming from pharmaceutical 
companies.174 This distinction forms part of the basis for the two 
recommendations to come in the Conclusion: first, that drug 
company sponsorship of external conferences does yield a net so-
cial benefit, and therefore should be permitted, provided appro-
priate safeguards are in place to deal with conflict of interest.175
Such conferences often feature university researchers as speakers, 
and as we shall see, the conflict of interest in these situations 
can be managed.176
 Likewise, the lower susceptibility of academic investiga-
tors to industry influence relative to company-compensated in-
vestigators helps to justify the second recommendation to come 
in the Conclusion: that companies’ own speaker series, featuring 
170 See Ordóñez et al., supra note 169, at 86. 
171 See Amanda L. Connors, Comment, Big Bad Pharma: An Ethical Anal-
ysis of Physician-Directed and Consumer-Directed Marketing Tactics, 73 ALB.
L. REV. 243 (2009). 
172 Ordóñez et al., supra note 169, at 84–85 (defining good scholarship as 
addressing important questions, generating knowledge, empirics, generating 
implications, and being widely consumed). 
173 See Ralph S. Brown & Jordan E. Kurland, Academic Tenure and Aca-
demic Freedom, 53 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 328–29 (1990) (defining academic 
tenure and discussing it as the main protector of academic freedom). 
174 See Basu, supra note 143, at 4235. 
175 See infra Recommendations and Conclusion. 
176 See Marcia M. Boumil et al., Pharmaceutical Speakers’ Bureaus, Aca-
demic Freedom, and the Management of Promotional Speaking at Academic 
Medical Centers, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 311 (2012). 
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practitioners they compensate as the paid speakers, in balance 
are likely to cause more social harm than benefit and should be 
prohibited by the professional and industrial codes of ethics.177
 One final concern does remain, though: is academic schol-
arship relevant to physicians’ treatment decisions? Is the basic 
research that comprises much university scholarship178 even ap-
plicable to practitioners? 
 Traditional basic research is unlikely to be of direct use to 
practitioners.179 A classic description of basic research is found 
in a report from the National Science Foundation: 
Basic research is performed without thought of practical ends. 
It results in general knowledge and understanding of nature and 
its laws. The general knowledge provides the means of answering 
a large number of important practical problems, though it may 
not give a complete specific answer to any one of them.180
Since basic research does not seek utility, much of it is unlikely 
to be of great help to doctors when they are selecting the best 
treatment for a patient.181
 In the years since 1945, however, universities increasingly 
are homes for applied research.182 Applied research has been de-
scribed by the National Institutes of Health as including patient-
oriented research, epidemiologic and behavioral research, outcomes 
research, and health services research.183 Applied research, as the 
term suggests, focuses on how science can be used.184 Medical 
177 See infra Recommendations and Conclusion. 
178 For comprehensive discussion on the role and function of basic research 
in universities, see generally D sir e Schauz, What is Basic Research? In-
sights from Historical Semantics, 52 MINERVA 273, 274–75 (2014). 
179 NAT’L SCI. FOUND., THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 




182 Indeed, scientists at universities often are entrepreneurs operating busi-
nesses. See Melissa S. Anderson, The Complex Relations Between the Academy 
and Industry, 72 J. HIGHER ED. 226, 230 (2001). 
183 Doris McGartland Rubio et al., Defining Translational Research: Impli-
cations for Training, 85 ACAD. MED. 470 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 
/pmc/articles/PMC2829707/#R4 [https://perma.cc/QH8Y-957N]. 
184 See Charles S. Reichardt & Melvin M. Mark, Quasi-experimentation, in
THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 193 (Leonard 
Bickman & Debra J. Rog eds., 2009) (observing that applied research “strives 
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applied research has been divided into two somewhat murky 
classifications: clinical research and translational research.185
 Clinical research refers to medical experimentation with 
human subjects.186 Clinical trials of drug products as required 
by the FDA are done on pharmaceuticals being developed for 
possible use.187 Translational research has been described to in-
clude “translating research into practice ... ensuring that new 
treatments and research knowledge actually reach the patients,” 
and enabling “clinicians and patients to change behaviors and 
make more informed choices.”188
 Whereas universities historically focused on basic re-
search,189 scientific papers today often have commercial applica-
tions.190 This shift reflects the profitability of research, having 
practical applications that can be monetized for both faculty and 
to improve our understanding of a ‘problem,’ with the intent of contributing 
to the solution of that problem.”). Of course, the bifurcation of research into 
categories of basic and applied is in some ways an unrealistic construct, as 
there is no clear delineation between the two. See Schauz, supra note 178, at 
274–75. As Hammersley observes, harkening to Kurt Lewin, good theory it-
self is useful. Martyn Hammersley, Action Research: A Contradiction in Terms?,
30 OXFORD REV. ED. 165, 166 (2004). 
185 For general discussion of these two categories of medical research, see
Rubio et al., supra note 183, at 470, 470–71. 
186 See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between 
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 386 n.134 
(2002) (quoting ALBERT R. JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS 192 (4th ed. 1998)) 
(“Clinical research is defined as any clinical intervention involving human 
subjects, patients or normal volunteers, performed in accord with a protocol 
designed to yield generalizable scientific knowledge.”). For a very practical 
and informative explanation by the FDA on clinical trials, see Learn About 
Drug and Device Approvals, The Drug Development Process, Step 3: Clinical 
Research, FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development 
-process/step-3-clinical-research [https://perma.cc/BCY9-AUEX]. 
187 See Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The Commercial 
Speech Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 203,
222 (2011) (“In order to obtain FDA drug approval, the results of clinical tri-
als must be reported to the FDA.”). 
188 Steven H. Woolf, Commentary, The Meaning of Translational Research 
and Why it Matters, 299 JAMA 211, 211 (2008). 
189 See David Korn, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Academic Medicine: 
Whence They Came, Where They Went, 8 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 6 (2010–11) 
(observing that an “enormous, world-leading American basic research enter-
prise” developed after World War II). 
190 Daniel Benoliel, The Impact of Institutions on Patent Propensity Across 
Countries, 33 B.U. INT’L L.J. 129, 144 (2015). 
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universities.191 It likely also reflects growing pressures on uni-
versities to demonstrate economic impact,192 as well as a societal 
shift to an increasingly entrepreneurial model of the university.193
 Going back as far as 1992, Chew noted that 31% of university 
research was applied or developmental,194 and suggested that 
universities are becoming increasingly entrepreneurial.195 Notwith-
standing the importance of basic research, practical applications 
can provide more readily appreciated public optics regarding the 
value universities create.196
 Seventeen years after Chew’s article, Frischmann observed 
that “[m]ost university science and technology research systems 
serve mixed commercial, public, and social ends by enabling the 
production of a wide variety of private, public, and nonmarket 
goods.”197 Thus, the trend toward more applied research appears 
to continue.198
191 See Philip G. Pardey et al., Creating, Protecting, and Using Crop Bio-
technologies Worldwide in an Era of Intellectual Property, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 213, 225 (2004) (discussing dynamics that “could shift the emphasis of 
university research from fundamental basic research toward more applied 
research that is potentially more rewarding financially for the university or 
its research faculty ....”). 
192 See Chanphirun Sam & Peter van der Sijde, Understanding the Concept of 
the Entrepreneurial University from the Perspective of Higher Education Models,
68 HIGHER ED. 891, 891 (2014) (“[C]hanges have been seen in the evolutionary 
roles of universities, which share the common trend from traditional missions 
of teaching and research to the third mission for economic development.”). 
193 See Alice Lam, From ‘Ivory Tower Traditionalists’ to ‘Entrepreneurial 
Scientists’?, 40 SOC. STUD. SCI. 307 (2010) (suggesting that an entrepreneurial 
model of the university is transforming academic sciences in a way that 
stresses “knowledge capitalization”). 
194 Pat K. Chew, Faculty-Generated Inventions: Who Owns the Golden Egg?,
1992 WIS. L. REV. 259, 307. 
195 Id. at 308. 
196 Indeed, there are societal expectations that some form of practical re-
turn on investment will come from funding academic research. See Benjamin 
F. Jones & Mohammad Ahmadpoor, Tracing the Links Between Basic Research 
and Real-World Applications, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 10, 2017, 2:01 PM), 
http://theconversation.com/tracing-the-links-between-basic-research-and-real 
-world-applications-82198 [https://perma.cc/BN34-AQJY] (“But what kind of 
return are we as a society recouping on this large investment in new discover-
ies? Does scientific research reliably lead to usable practical advances?”). 
197 Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143,
2154 (2009) (emphasis in original). 
198 See id.
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 Why is this trend relevant? The trend addresses the ques-
tion, even if universities might be expected to be the most disin-
terested, objective sources of good drug treatment for physicians, 
do university investigators do that kind of research? Increasingly, 
the answer is yes, they often do.199
B. Supporting Medical Research as a Rationale for Relationships 
with Physicians 
 The second function of interaction between drug compa-
nies and healthcare professionals that is posited in the PhRMA 
Code is the support of medical research.200 Let’s start with an 
axiom: research on pharmaceutical products to determine their 
efficacy and safety is critically important.201 A second axiom is that 
pharmaceutical companies have the interest, the resources, the 
stakes, and indeed the legal obligation under current regulations to 
engage in such testing as part of the drug approval process.202
 This research role of the pharmaceutical industry certainly 
does entail interaction with healthcare professionals.203 But what 
should that interaction look like? Consider the range of interactions. 
One is identification of medical experts to engage in research.204
Another is cooperation with those experts in the development of 
research questions, projects, and protocols. In fact, drug compa-
nies accomplish these important tasks by hiring qualified re-
searchers to perform the clinical trials required by law.205
199 See id.
200 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 2 and text accompanying 
note 199. 
201 Why is Pharmacology Research Important?, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (Dec. 1, 
2016), https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/pharma/conditioninfo/important 
[https://perma.cc/B5FB-LMZM] (observing that pharmacology research serves 
to determine both safety and effectiveness of medications). 
202 See generally Development and Approval Process: Drugs, FDA (Oct. 28, 
2019, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs [https:// 
perma.cc/32CH-UMVY].
203 See id.
204 See Alexander Schuhmacher et al., Changing R&D Models in Research-
Based Pharmaceutical Companies, 14 J. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 105, 110 (2016)
(observing that the pharmaceutical industry traditionally has relied on third 
parties for specialized expertise). 
205 Under the U.S. regulatory model, clinical trials are conducted and fi-
nanced by pharmaceutical companies. See Jennifer S. Bard, What to do When 
You Can’t Hear the Whistleblowing: A Proposal to Protect the Public’s Health 
56 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:023 
 In these ways, pharmaceutical research benefits from, and 
indeed relies on, corporate interaction with medical profession-
als.206 But interaction and employment of medical staff are one 
thing; subsidies, honoraria and perquisites to non-employee prac-
titioners are another thing entirely.207 There is no rational link 
that requires the latter to enable the former.208
 If pharmaceutical research is to be objective, the relation-
ship between companies and external researchers should be as 
unsullied as possible.209 On this research purity dimension, the 
marketing functions of drug companies cannot, in any reasonable 
way, be justified as serving the “supporting medical research” 
function.210 The two are simply unrelated: selling the company’s 
product to doctors has no connection to researching products.211
If anything, these two functions are incompatible with one an-
other: doctors who receive perquisites from a company are no 
longer the disinterested, objective scientists best qualified to in-
vestigate and evaluate the company’s products.212
 Given that companies do have the stakes and the resources 
to sponsor research on their products, and in light of resource 
scarcity and the inability of government to support all the research 
by Providing Whistleblower Protection for Medical Researchers, 9 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 1, 4 (2012) (“It is the fragmented way research and drug development is 
structured in the United States which makes it so hard to protect the public. U.S. 
law divides human subjects’ safety oversight into two separate jurisdictions: 
first, research funded by agencies of the Federal Government and second, drug 
trials paid for by pharmaceutical companies.”) (internal citations omitted). 
206 See Schuhmacher et al., supra note 204, at 109. 
207 See Bard, supra note 205, at 36. 
208 See Cole Wayant et al., Research Letter, Financial Conflicts of Interest 
Among Oncologist Authors of Reports of Clinical Trials, 4 JAMA ONCOLOGY
1426, 1427 (2018). 
209 Sameer S. Chopra, Industry Funding of Clinical Trials: Benefit or Bias?,
290 JAMA 113, 113 (2003) (“[S]cientists who design, conduct, analyze, and 
report clinical trials often receive monetary compensation from drug compa-
nies, in the form of either salaries or consulting fees. These arrangements 
raise several concerns.”). 
210 Mace L. Rothenberg & David H. Johnson, Conflict of Interest, Conflict-
ing Interests, and Effective Collaboration Between Academia and Industry on 
Preclinical and Clinical Cancer Research, 3 JAMA ONCOLOGY 1621 (2017). 
211 See Wayant et al., supra note 208, at 1427. 
212 For discussion of the relationship between investigator conflict of inter-
est and quality of scientific research, see id; see also Rothenberg & Johnson, 
supra note 210, at 1621–22.
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needed,213 we do not have the luxury of disqualifying industry 
funding as a source of scientific research sponsorship.214 However, 
we can and should impose legal and ethical constraints on the 
relationship and the funding. 
 These constraints ought to comprise three main catego-
ries: disqualification of research when, for whatever reason, an 
investigator is subject to conflicts of interest that cannot be 
managed;215 a requirement that researchers with manageable 
conflicts of interest disclose the conflict;216 and a prohibition of 
unnecessary, ancillary forms and sources of conflict of interest. 
This last category is the relevant one to this discussion: there is 
no benefit to anyone, apart from the pharmaceutical company 
and the doctors who benefit, to providing perquisites directly to 
physicians, beyond the funding of research itself.217
C.  Obtaining Feedback About Products from Medical Experts as 
a Rationale for Relationships with Physicians 
 The final function of the corporate relationship with doctors 
noted in the PhRMA Code is the receipt by drug manufacturers 
of feedback from practitioners regarding their products.218 While 
213 See Joanne Waldstreicher & Michael E. Johns, Viewpoint, Managing 
Conflicts of Interest in Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research, 317 JAMA 
1751, 1751 (2017) (“Companies engaged in health care research and develop-
ment share, with health professionals, academic health centers, patient advocacy 
organizations, and other medical and health-related institutions, the mission 
to improve human health. Companies play indispensable roles in advancing 
almost all aspects of this mission, including sponsoring clinical research and 
generating clinical data that serve as the basis for drug and device approvals, 
guidelines, and prescribing information.”). 
214 See Bard, supra note 205, at 34. 
215 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48. 
216 An example of the disclosure approach is Japan’s Clinical Practice 
Guidelines, under which pharmaceutical company payments to physicians 
are disclosed. Hiroaki Saito et al., Evaluation of Pharmaceutical Company 
Payments and Conflict of Interest Disclosures Among Oncology Clinical Practice 
Guideline Authors in Japan, JAMA NETWORK OPEN (Apr. 26, 2019), https:// 
jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2731682 [https://perma 
.cc/28XD-DA99] (“In accordance with the Japanese Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers Association guidelines for transparency, pharmaceutical company payments 
to physicians have been disclosed since 2013.”). 
217 See infra Section II.C.2. 
218 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95 and text accompanying note 99. 
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the feedback function is important, it neither requires nor justi-
fies giving company benefits directly to doctors.219 The following 
subsections explore why the feedback loop from practitioners to 
drug companies is so important, and why gifts and payments to 
physicians for lecturing are unnecessary to the feedback loop. 
1. Why the Feedback Loop from Practitioners to Drug  
Companies Is Important 
 The FDA new drug approval process is inherently imperfect: 
it is impossible to devise a drug approval system that evaluates 
efficacy and safety with complete accuracy.220 Medical research 
is subject to uncertainty and error.221 Moreover, if clinical trials 
are to have any hope of giving us useful pharmaceuticals, ap-
proval processes need to be reasonably expedient,222 and of 
course, there is a natural, unavoidable tension between expedi-
ency and thoroughness.223
 Accordingly, FDA drug approval protocols balance the de-
sire to approach research perfection with the need of patients for 
promising and timely treatments, especially when the alterna-
tives are limited and prognoses are poor.224 Moreover, long-term 
219 See id.
220 See Nicholas S. Downing et al., Original Investigation, Postmarket 
Safety Events Among Novel Therapeutics Approved by the US Food and Drug 
Administration Between 2001 and 2010, 317 JAMA 1854 (2017) (observing 
that for 222 novel therapeutics during the time period studied, there were 
123 postmarket safety events that led to withdrawals, boxed warnings, and 
safety communications). 
221 See id.
222 This need has led to expedited FDA review processes. See Thomas J. 
Hwang et al., Research Letter, The FDA’s Expedited Programs and Clinical 
Development Times for Novel Therapeutics, 2012–2016, 318 JAMA 2137 
(2017) (discussing four expedited FDA programs: “(1) priority review leads to 
FDA review in 6 months (vs 10 months for standard review); (2) accelerated 
approval permits approval based on surrogate measures; and (3) fast-track 
and (4) breakthrough therapy programs are intended to reduce the duration 
of clinical trials.”). 
223 Anupam B. Jena et al., The Trade-off Between Speed and Safety in Drug 
Approvals, 3 JAMA ONCOLOGY 1465 (2017). 
224 See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Four Ways to Address the Ethical Ten-
sions Around Expedited Approval of New Prescription Drugs, HEALTH
AFFS. BLOG (June 23, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog 
20160623.055507/full/ [https://perma.cc/9GJV-P6RE] (“Because testing new 
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risks and harms take years to appear, therefore clinical trials 
will not discover them prior to approval.225
 The AIDS crisis in the 1980s illustrates the tension be-
tween rigorous thoroughness and the need to provide promising 
treatments without undue delay.226 When effective treatments 
did not yet exist, growing numbers of patients lacked the time to 
wait for perfect research.227 Both the FDA and pharmaceutical 
companies were faced with the challenge of balancing meticu-
lous, time-consuming studies with the need for promising, yet-
to-be-proven options.228 Accordingly, fast-track approval processes 
proliferated.229 However, whenever pre-marketing approvals are 
expedited or abbreviated, the need for post-approval surveil-
lance becomes increasingly important.230
drugs requires a delay between identification of an important, novel prescrip-
tion drug and FDA approval, some patients with serious or life-threatening 
illnesses and no satisfactory options will not live to see a potentially life-
saving medication approved for public use. To address this concern, the FDA 
and Congress have established several programs—with the support of phar-
maceutical manufacturers and some patient advocacy groups—that allow new 
drug approval based on less evidence, so that patients and their physicians 
have faster access and potentially a greater choice of therapies.”). 
225 See Krishnan Vengadaraga Chary, Editorial, Expedited Drug Review 
Process: Fast, but Flawed, 7 J. PHARMACOLOGY & PHARMACOTHERAPEUTICS
57, 58 (2016) (discussing drug approvals that were later withdrawn due to 
outcomes unpredicted in the original research that supported the approvals). 
226 Jon Scott Batterman, Note, Brother Can You Spare a Drug: Should the 
Experimental Drug Distribution Standards Be Modified in Response to the 
Needs of Persons with AIDS?, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 193–95 (1990). 
227 See id. (“Based on the lack of FDA-approved drugs for the treatment of 
AIDS, many persons suffering from the syndrome are desperately seeking access 
to drugs which have been approved for experimental testing on humans, but 
which have not satisfied the rigid safety and effectiveness testing criteria of 
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.”) (internal citations omitted). 
228 See Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: 
A Contractarian Model of Access, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 403 (1994) (observ-
ing the conflict that existed in the 1980s between rigorous scientific research 
and the time-sensitive needs of patients seeking effective HIV and AIDS 
treatment options). 
229 Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Trends in Utilization of FDA Expedited Drug 
Development and Approval Programs, 1987–2014: Cohort Study, 351 THE
BMJ 1 (2015) (“In the past two decades, drugs newly approved by the FDA 
have been associated with an increasing number of expedited development or 
review programs.”). 
230 This need is especially important given concerns that fast-track pro-
cesses may have been motivated not simply by concern for patients, but also 
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 Thus, FDA new drug approvals cannot be viewed as con-
clusive; rather, they aim to optimize the balance between ap-
proaching research perfection and the realities of error and a 
need for reasonable speed in bringing promising pharmaceuticals 
to market.231 Because new drug approvals are based on incon-
clusive determinations, mechanisms for post-approval monitor-
ing and feedback are crucial.232
 The PhRMA Code appropriately recognizes the experience 
of prescribing physicians and their patients as essential to this 
ongoing, post-approval assessment.233 The Code correctly posits 
post-approval monitoring and feedback as a good reason for a 
relationship to exist between pharmaceutical companies and 
doctors.234 However, as we shall see in the next Subsection, this 
relationship need not and should not entail some common but 
ethically tainted practices and transactions. 
as FDA payback to the powerful drug companies that underwrite much of the 
FDA budget. See Caroline Chen, FDA Repays Industry by Rushing Risky 
Drugs to Market, PROPUBLICA (June 26, 2018, 5 AM), https://www.propublica 
.org/article/fda-repays-industry-by-rushing-risky-drugs-to-market [https:// 
perma.cc/UK8A-4STH] (“As pharma companies underwrite three-fourths of the 
FDA’s budget for scientific reviews, the agency is increasingly fast-tracking 
expensive drugs with significant side effects and unproven health benefits.”). 
231 See Fast Track, FDA (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/patients/fast  
-track-breakthrough-therapy-accelerated-approval-priority-review/fast-track 
[https://perma.cc/QWK9-YXRR] (stating fast track processing is meant to ex-
pedite review of drugs that meet two criteria: “treat[ing] serious conditions 
and fill[ing] an unmet medical need.”). The breadth of these criteria for fast 
track review highlights the importance the FDA places on speed in getting 
promising drug treatments to patients in need. 
232 See Paul Kubler, Fast-Tracking of New Drugs: Getting the Balance 
Right, 41 AUSTL. PRESCRIBER 98, 99 (2018) (observing that “[a]ccess to new 
therapies is a balance between evidence (determining the risk of acceptable 
adverse effects versus efficacy) and the speed of availability, intersected by the 
issue of affordability[,]” and therefore “[r]apidly approved drugs should receive 
provisional registration for a period of three years and the drug company should be 
required to provide annual data on the postmarketing experience.”). 
233 PhRMA, BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: THE PROCESS 
BEHIND NEW MEDICINES 16 (2015) (stating “[r]esearch on a new medicine does 
not end when the discovery and development phases are completed and the 
medicine is available to patients.”). 
234 See Opinion 9.6.2, supra note 47. 
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2. Why Gifts and Payments by Drug Companies for Lecturing 
Are Unnecessary to the Feedback Loop 
 Practitioner and patient feedback to drug manufacturers 
neither requires nor benefits from various perquisites currently 
provided to doctors.235 Relationships do not require emolument, 
especially in areas where the public good demands professional 
and commercial ethical commitments from associations like the 
AMA, the PhRMA, and the constituencies they represent.236
 An effective and appropriate mechanism already exists for 
feedback from doctors to pharmaceutical companies: the FDA’s 
adverse event reporting system.237 The agency’s MedWatch web-
site is a vehicle for both physicians and patients “to voluntarily 
report a serious adverse event, product quality problem, product 
use/medication error, or therapeutic inequivalence/failure that 
[they] suspect is associated with the use of an FDA-regulated 
drug, biologic, medical device, dietary supplement or cosmetic.”238
Moreover, this voluntary reporting mechanism is not the only 
vehicle for feedback on drug efficacy and safety.239 Rather, it en-
hances mandatory reporting by facilities, distributers, import-
ers, applicants, and manufacturers.240
 There is no justifiable connection between this important 
feedback loop and gifts or payments from companies to doctors.241
235 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 11 (suggesting items and 
gifts provided to doctors should not be offered); see also Opinion 9.6.2, supra
note 47 (suggesting the risk of gifts causing bias on “professional judgment in 
the care of patients.”). 
236 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 11; Opinion 9.6.2, supra note 47. 




239 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING FOR OUT-
SOURCING FACILITIES UNDER SECTION 503B OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND 
COSMETIC ACT: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 2, 9 (Oct. 2015). 
240 Id. (referring to “postmarketing adverse experience reports required 
under 21 CFR 310.305, 314.80, 314.98, and 600.80 ... 760 of the FD&C Act ... 
and [u]nder section 503B ....”) (internal citations omitted). 
241 See PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 11 (suggesting certain items 
should not be offered to health care professionals); see also Opinion 9.6.2, supra
note 47 (stating “[g]ifts to physicians from industry create conditions that carry 
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The argument might be made that paid physician speaker pro-
grams enhance feedback about products because they provide a 
venue where pharmaceutical representatives and doctors meet, 
mingle, and interact, and that such opportunities might increase 
the chance that drug companies will learn about the clinical ex-
periences of the doctors who prescribe their products.242 Any-
thing that increases interactions between manufacturers and 
prescribers also increases communication generally, and ideally 
also specifically around product strengths and weaknesses.243
 However, serious conflict of interest problems to be dis-
cussed in the following Section outweigh any dubious and tenu-
ous value of paid speaker programs as events supporting the 
feedback loop.244 Physicians are highly trained professionals 
from whom we rightly expect the highest level of commitment 
and rectitude.245 If we do not adequately do so already, we should 
train them to report all adverse clinical experiences to manufac-
turers, without the need for artificially constructed interaction 
opportunities that are grounded in ethically troubling payments, 
and we should both expect and professionally require that they 
do so. While feedback to drug companies does justify their rela-
tionship with physicians, it cannot justify transactions that are 
tainted by unacceptable conflicts that can compromise optimal 
patient treatment decisions.246
the risk of subtly biasing—or being perceived to bias—professional judgment 
in the care of patients.”). 
242 See Manasa Shankar, Are Promotional Speaker Programs Going the 
Distance?, BEROE (July 30, 2019), https://www.beroeinc.com/whitepaper/are 
-promotional-speaker-programs-going-the-distance/ [https://perma.cc/UZ72-WT23] 
(suggesting the importance of speaker programs and how they “help physicians 
stay up-to-date on information about new medicines, new uses of medicines, 
the latest clinical data, appropriate dosing, and emerging safety issues.”). 
243 See id. (stating that speaker programs “help professionals stay up-to-
date on the latest developments in the industry.”). 
244 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 41, at 166–67. 
245 Along these lines, Mehlman suggests that doctors have a fiduciary role. 
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why Physicians Are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 2, 15, 57, 63 (2015). 
246 Johns, supra note 57, at 968–70 (describing the present issues of off-label 
prescriptions and how conflicts of interest arising from drug sponsorships can 
hurt optimal patient treatment). 
2020] MEDICAL JUDGMENT AND MARKETING 63 
III. EXAMINING THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN TRANSACTIONS
BETWEEN DRUG COMPANIES AND DOCTORS
 As noted in Part I, the previous version of the AMA Code, 
prior to the 2016 revision, provided one, but only one, example of 
a benefit of gifts to practitioners: the provision of educational 
seminars and conferences.247 It makes sense that the drafters 
chose it, because it is the sole plausible justification of pharma-
ceutical industry gratuities provided to medical and pharmaceu-
tical practitioners.248 Yet even this strongest case example has 
flaws, all related to conflicts of interest or both pharmaceutical 
companies and medical practitioners under current practices.249
 This Section explores two of the most prevalent and po-
tentially concerning of these conflicts. Subsection A below dis-
cusses the nature of the conflict of interest that exists when 
pharmaceutical companies fund the educational seminars and 
conferences of external professional organizations. Subsection B 
examines the conflict of interest when pharmaceutical companies 
sponsor their own speaker programs. The analysis suggests that 
the conflict of interest explored in Subsection A is an acceptable 
one that can be effectively managed,250 whereas the conflict in 
Subsection B is unacceptable and cannot be rendered acceptable 
through conflict of interest management protocols.251
A. Conflict of Interest When Pharmaceutical Companies Fund 
the Continuing Medical Education Offered by External
Professional Organizations 
 Recall that Opinion 9.2.7 of the current version of the AMA 
Code of Medical Ethics says whenever possible, CME funding and 
staffing should come from independent sources that do not have a 
financial relationship with either the industry or the educational 
247 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
248 See id.
249 See id.
250 See id. (describing one perspective of the intentions set forth in previ-
ous opinion 8.061). 
251 See id. (describing another perspective of the intentions set forth in the 
same opinion). 
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subject matter.252 When funding and staffing from independent 
sources is not possible, those who “organize ..., teach ..., or have 
other roles in ... CME”253 must: 
(a) Be transparent about financial relationships that could 
potentially influence educational activities. 
(b) Provide the information physician-learners need to make 
critical judgments about an educational activity, including: 
1. The source(s) and nature of commercial support for 
the activity 
2. The source(s) and nature of any individual financial 
relationships with industry related to the subject mat-
ter of the activity 
3. What steps have been taken to mitigate the potential 
influence of financial relationships 
(c) Protect the independence of educational activities by: 
1. Ensuring independent, prospective assessment of ed-
ucational needs and priorities 
2. Adhering to a transparent process for prospectively 
determining when industry support is needed 
3. Giving preference in selecting faculty or content de-
velopers to similarly qualified experts who do not have 
financial interests in the educational subject matter 
4. Ensuring a transparent process for making decisions 
about participation by physicians who may have a fi-
nancial interest in the educational subject matter 
5. Permitting individuals who have a substantial financial 
interest in the educational subject matter to partici-
pate in CME only when their participation is central 
to the success of the educational activity; the activity 
meets a demonstrated need in the professional com-
munity; and the source, nature, and magnitude of the 
individual’s specific financial interest is disclosed 
6. Taking steps to mitigate potential influence commen-
surate with the nature of the financial interest(s) at 
issue, such as prospective peer review.254
 This current approach liberalizes a more stringent posi-
tion in Previous Version Opinion 8.061 of the AMA Code of Med-
ical Ethics, which sought to reduce potential conflicts of interest 
252 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48 (stating “[w]hen possible, CME should 
be provided without such support or the participation of individuals who have 
financial interests in the educational subject matter.”). 
253 See id.
254 See id.
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regarding CME in two clear, direct, simple, straightforward ways.255
It required company subsidies that benefit professional conference 
attendees to be indirect,256 and it prohibited company sponsors 
from influencing conference content, materials, and presenters.257
 Current Opinion 9.2.7 contains no language expressly pro-
hibiting the payment of conference subsidies directly to physicians 
who attend the event.258 Likewise, it no longer contains the out-
right prohibition that was in Previous Opinion 8.061 against spon-
sors exercising influence over content, materials, or presenters.259
The more elaborate list of relatively vague steps contained in 
Current Opinion 9.2.7 for managing transparency and objectivity 
are slippery: they lack the substance, gravitas, and straightforward 
clarity of the previous, more concise restrictions of Previous Opinion 
8.061.260 They make it hard or impossible to pin down what is or 
is not a violation.261 They leave far too much judgment and dis-
cretion to physicians facing tempting, remunerative opportunities to 
serve themselves rather than their patients.262
 Motives for the change can only be speculated, as profes-
sional codes do not come with the historic documentation that we 
get in legislative history.263 At best, the changes were intended 
to create more CME opportunities by removing the previously 
tight, clear restrictions. At worst, they may be motivated in part 
or in full by self-interested industry pressures, practitioner pres-
sures, or both. 
 The requirements in both the current version and the 
previous version do evince recognition by the medical profession 
of the need to address conflict of interest when pharmaceutical 
companies provide benefits to doctors.264 But do they sufficiently 
255 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
256 See id. (stating “[s]ubsidies from industry should not be accepted directly 
....”).
257 See id. (describing how sponsor subsidies should be used for conferences). 
258 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48 (lacking any prohibition regarding the 
direct payment of conference subsidies towards physicians). 




263 See generally Opinion 8.061, supra note 49; Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48. 
264 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49 (stating “there has been growing con-
cern about certain gifts from industry to physicians. Some gifts that reflect 
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manage and control the conflict of interest? Previous Opinion 
8.061 did sufficiently manage the conflict of interest for doc-
tors,265 but the muddier expectations in Current Opinion 9.2.7 
fail to acceptably address the conflict of interest.266
 Opinion 8.061 did not eliminate the subsidy running from 
companies to doctors, but it did strongly attenuate it by channel-
ing it through the conference sponsors.267 Physicians still received 
conference cost savings, and of course they saw conference pro-
gram recognition lists of the sponsors of the conferences they at-
tend.268 So conference attendees had the information to be aware 
that they are paying less to attend the conference, or getting 
more benefits, or both, because Company X was a sponsor.269
 In theory, of course, this could still have created a sense of 
gratitude and indebtedness.270 However, because medical con-
ferences typically have multiple pharmaceutical company271
sponsors providing only indirect financial support under Former 
Opinion 8.061,272 the conflict of interest was diluted and attenu-
ated via the indirect nature of the sponsorship.273 A doctor is un-
likely to be swayed in her prescriptions by minor and indirect 
financial support.274
customary practices of industry may not be consistent with the Principles of 
Medical Ethics.”); Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48 (stating “[f]inancial or in-kind 
support from ... companies that have a direct interest in physicians’ recom-
mendations creates conditions in which external interests could influence the 
availability and/or content of continuing medical education (CME).”). 
265 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
266 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48. 
267 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49 (stating “any subsidy should be ac-
cepted by the conference’s sponsor who in turn can use the money to reduce 
the conference’s registration fee.”). 
268 See id.
269 See id.
270 See id. (stating “[s]ome gifts that reflect customary practices of industry 
may not be consistent with the Principles of Medical Ethics.”). 
271 ACCREDITATION COUNCIL FOR CONTINUING MED. EDUC., ACCME DATA 
REPORT: GROWTH AND DIVERSITY IN CONTINUING MEDICAL EDUCATION—2017, 
6 (2018). 
272 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49 (describing how financial support 
provided by sponsors is utilized). 
273 See id. (describing all the limitations to the directness of sponsorship 
gifts to physicians). 
274 See id.
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 Indeed, many or most attendees might not even be think-
ing about any informal or implied sense of indebtedness, given 
that the transaction’s influence was spread across all attendees 
and made remote through the intermediary of the conference or-
ganizers.275 In addition, when a number of the manufacturers of 
competing treatments sponsor a professional meeting, their sub-
sidies effectively cancel each other out in terms of corrupt influ-
ence over patient treatment decisions.276
 Given the social value of continuing medical education as 
well as the substantial cost of conferences,277 the Former Opinion 
8.061 requirement that conference subsidies were not directly paid 
to attendees was a reasonable compromise between encouraging 
continuing education and managing conflicts of interest.278 The 
subsidies contributed to the goal of keeping practitioner knowledge 
fresh and updated, yet they were unlikely to taint patient treatment 
decisions generally and prescription patterns specifically.279
275 See id. An analogy easily comes to mind to any law scholar: the spon-
sorship of law faculty conference events by textbook publishers. Technically, 
those who attend benefit from sponsorship. But all or virtually all textbook 
publishers sponsor, and it is unlikely that any law professor’s textbook adop-
tion decisions are influenced by this attenuated benefit. The benefit is diluted 
when most of all the publishing companies sponsor, and law faculty likely are 
not making the connection between the benefit and their decisions. Quid-pro-
quo dynamics are negligible if most competitors in an industry are sponsors, 
and the benefit passes through the organizer of the conference. 
276 See id. (explaining how conference resources should be allocated and 
organized. Here, conference organizers are able to control the conference con-
text rather than sponsoring companies). 
277 Attending a conference will typically entail a substantial cash outlay. 
These costs to attendees typically include payment of a registration fee, pur-
chase of airfare and hotel accommodation, payment of ground transportation, 
and the cost of meals. See Joseph Hong, The High Cost of Opportunity: Paying 
for Academic Conferences, DIVERSE EDUC. (Jan. 15, 2018), https://diverseedu 
cation.com/article/108234/ [https://perma.cc/VE2T-M4VF] (demonstrating that 
conferences serve as “economic barriers for early-career academics.”). The 
amount of the registration fee, and how many meals are included with that 
fee, obviously are affected by how much of these are underwritten by confer-
ence sponsors. See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49 (stating “any subsidy should 
be accepted by the conference’s sponsor who in turn can use the money to re-
duce the conference’s registration fee.”). 
278 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49 (demonstrating the difficulty in balancing 
the social benefits and violation of ethics in regard to industry gifts to physicians). 
279 See id.
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 Former Opinion 8.061’s prohibition of company sponsors’ 
influencing of conference content, materials, and presenters was 
an effective and appropriate second prong in addressing the con-
flict of interest challenges in these situations.280 One peril that 
both society and patients should worry about is that drug com-
pany payments will subvert the objective medical judgment of 
practitioners.281 The content, materials, and presenters restriction 
effectively covered the various ways that a corporate sponsor might, 
if allowed, attempt to sway practitioner judgment by injecting 
biased content into the conference proceedings themselves.282
 In other words, the two prongs of Opinion 8.061—banning 
direct payment to doctors, and prohibiting influence over content, 
materials, and presenters—elegantly and effectively covered the 
two avenues by which company sponsorship might undermine 
practitioner objectivity: payoffs and biased indoctrination.283
 Unfortunately, these safeguards that rendered industry 
sponsorship of CME acceptable in light of conflict of interest 
challenges have been eviscerated in a smokescreen of replace-
ment language that may seem impressive on its face, but actually 
achieves little.284 The ephemeral, slippery, vague edicts in Cur-
rent Opinion 9.2.7 simply fail to provide the same protections of 
Previous Version 8.061.285 A careful reading of the long new list 
of standards286 demonstrates that they really do not require much 
that can be pinned down.287
 Instead, they repeatedly exhort the parties to “ensure” to 
“adhere” to “take steps” to “give preference to.”288 How do you de-
termine exactly what these kinds of slippery edicts mean? The 
safeguards, even if created with the best intentions and in the best 
spirit, are illusory because they leave everything to the judgment of 
the very people who face highly tempting conflicts of interest.289
280 See id.
281 See Johns, supra note 57, at 970. 
282 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
283 See id.
284 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48. 
285 See id.; see also Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
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B. Conflict of Interest in Drug Company-Hosted Speaker Programs 
 Pharmaceutical companies routinely host their own speaker 
programs, compensating the presenters with speaker fees and 
also inviting and entertaining attendees, typically with high-end 
dinners and drinks.290 These companies have incentives to select 
both speakers and attendees based on their own marketing ob-
jectives, rather than on truly disinterested educational goals.291
From the standpoint of marketing strategy, it makes good business 
sense if presenters are prescribing physicians, or prospectively 
prescribing physicians who regularly meet with the companies’ 
pharmaceutical representatives, or physicians with whom the 
representatives want to create such a relationship.292
 Company-hosted speaker programs are not inherently ei-
ther noble or nefarious. They are, however, fraught with con-
flicts and a substantial risk that their content and objectives will 
be biased.293 The serious risks associated with speaker programs 
are far from theoretical. While speaker programs are not legally 
prohibited, rampant abuses have resulted in many millions of 
dollars in settlements for charges under federal statutes that 
290 See Adriane Fugh-Berman & Nuria Homedes, How Drug Companies 
Manipulate Prescribing Behavior, 46 COLOM. J. ANESTHESIOLOGY 317, 318 
(2018) (“A rep may invite a physician to give a dinner talk to a small group at 
an excellent restaurant. The subject of the talk does not matter, because this 
is a chance for the rep to both honor and pay the speaker, who then responds 
by prescribing more of the rep’s drugs.”). 
291 See id. at 318–19. 
292 See Alix Spiegel, How to Win Doctors And Influence Prescriptions, NPR 
(Oct. 21, 2010, 4:11 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story 
Id=130730104 [https://perma.cc/JL7V-ZJRX]. Pharmaceutical representatives 
typically are assigned to a geographical district, where they are tasked to 
meet with a targeted group of physicians. See What Does a Pharmaceutical 
Sales Representative Do?, CAREEREXPLORER, https://www.careerexplorer.com 
/careers/pharmaceutical-sales-representative/ [https://perma.cc/A44U-VQ4W]. 
These representatives organize the speaker programs and select both the 
speakers and the invitees. See id. Some are physicians who already substan-
tially prescribe the company’s products, and the task here is to maintain both 
the relationship and the strong prescription numbers. See id. Others are phy-
sicians who do not prescribe the company’s products in desired numbers, whom 
the company seeks to win over. See id. 
293 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318–20. 
70 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:023 
are not even aimed at the pharmaceutical industry.294 These in-
clude a $38 million settlement under the False Claims Act as well 
as several multimillion-dollar settlements under the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act.295
 The main government tools to curtail continuing and ram-
pant abuses are “Corporate Integrity Agreements” (CIAs) that can 
be required by the Office of Inspector General.296 While CIAs likely 
do make some headway against abusive practices, the perils of 
company-sponsored speaker programs outweigh the benefits, 
and they should simply be eliminated.297
 Granted, pharmaceutical companies’ own speaker programs 
do have a potential social benefit: the education of the health-
care professionals who attend them.298 If—and this is a big if—a 
company’s own programs can somehow maintain complete objec-
tivity and not be tainted by conflict of interest—they can add to 
the knowledge of prescribing practitioners.299
 Pharmaceutical companies are certainly in a good position 
to educate practitioners for two reasons. First, the companies 
are a source of much high quality, useful information.300 By virtue 
of the time and expertise they invest in developing drug treat-
ments,301 they are among the institutions most likely to have a 
wealth of information. 
 Second, pharmaceutical companies have tremendous re-
sources—arguably unmatched by other institutions—to devote 
294 Richard L. Cassin, Compliance Alert: Speaker Fees Are Often Toxic,
FCPA BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017, 1:28 PM), https://fcpablog.com/2017/1/4/compliance 
-alert-speaker-fees-are-often-toxic/ [https://perma.cc/S4PB-JJAY]. 
295 Id.
296 See COGNIZANT 20-20 INSIGHTS, HELPING PHARMAS MANAGE COMPLI-
ANCE RISKS FOR SPEAKER PROGRAMS 4 (2017). 
297 See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 41, at 10, 184–85. 
298 See id. at 2, 9, 155. 
299 See id.
300 See Geoffrey K. Spurling et al., Information from Pharmaceutical Compa-
nies and the Quality, Quantity, and Cost of Physicians’ Prescribing: A Systematic 
Review, 7 PLOS MED 1, 2 (Oct. 2010). 
301 See Matej Mikulic, Total Global Pharmaceutical R&D Spending 2010–
2024, STATISTA (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/309466/global 
-r-and-d-expenditure-for-pharmaceuticals/ [https://perma.cc/YZ6E-2WQK] (report-
ing global pharmaceutical industry R&D expenditure for 2018 as $179 billion). 
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to the education of healthcare professionals.302 They have the funds 
to be among the most effective providers to physicians of current 
scientific and medical information regarding treatment options.303
 However, great risks are associated with pharmaceutical 
company speaker series. The following subsections examine these 
risks: the risk that pharmaceutical companies will not present 
information entirely accurately and objectively; the risk that paid 
speakers will not be objective and impartial; the risk that paid pro-
gram speakers lose their objectivity in decisions regarding pre-
scription of the company’s products; and the risk that company 
provision of dining, drinks, and social entertainment will hinder 
the objectivity of physicians who attend the programs as learners. 
 After examining all these risks, we examine the relative 
likelihood of pharmaceutical company speaker programs being 
predominantly beneficial or predominantly harmful. Finally, we 
discuss whether disclosure of conflict of interest is a sufficient 
safeguard to protect patients’ interest such that drug company 
speaker programs should be acceptable as long as the disclosure 
is made. 
1. The Risk that Paid Pharmaceutical Company Speakers 
Will Not Present Information Accurately and Objectively 
 Pharmaceutical companies do not spend money educating 
physicians as philanthropy; they are profit-seeking businesses.304
There is a conflict of interest when companies host speaker pro-
grams to increase sales.305 Revenue goals put pressure on compa-
nies to sell, and not simply to provide forums where information 
is objectively presented.306
302 See STATISTA, INDUSTRY REPORT, MANUFACTURING: PHARMACEUTICALS 
& MEDICINE IN THE U.S. 2020, 65 (June 2018), https://www.statista.com/study/45 
278/manufacturing-pharmaceuticals-and-medicine/ [https://perma.cc/Z2B9 
-KMUM] (“The industry realized a total value of shipments of US$268.6 bil-
lion in 2017, a growth of 8.8% compared to 2016.”). 
303 See id.
304 Margaret Visnji, Understanding the New Pharma Business Model, R&P 
(Feb. 4, 2019), https://revenuesandprofits.com/understanding-the-new-pharma 
-business-model/ [https://perma.cc/2SHH-AJPM] (“Pharma companies like any 
other business are here to make money.”). 
305 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318. 
306 This pressure has led, for example, to accounts and FDA documentation of 
“repeated instances of pharmaceutical representatives presenting one-sided 
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 It can be argued that professional ethics can and should 
deter pharmaceutical companies from slanting information in their 
speaker programs.307 It would be foolish and naïve to expect pro-
fessional ethics to curtail the conflict of interest regularly and 
consistently, given the intense financial performance pressures 
that pharmaceutical companies face.308
 Indeed, there is a crucially important logical inconsistency 
in how the AMA Code addresses the danger of drug companies 
skewing the content of professional education.309 The AMA Code 
recognizes the ethical risks when drug companies sponsor exter-
nal conferences and continuing medical education.310 It fails, 
however, to address the even greater risks of company speaker 
programs that feature highly paid practitioner speakers.311
2. The Risk That Paid Program Speakers Lose Their  
Objectivity in Decisions Regarding Prescription of the  
Company’s Products 
 When pharmaceutical companies pay speaker fees, the 
compensated doctors can easily lose their impartiality in pre-
scription decisions.312 We would hope that doctors would rise 
information that downplays risks and negates warnings.” Vukadin, supra
note 24, at 84. For discussion of revenue drivers in the pharmaceutical industry, 
see generally Ajay Gautam, The Changing Model of Big Pharma: Impact of Key 
Trends, 21 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 379, 384 (Mar. 2016). 
307 See ADRIAN KILCOYNE ET AL. EDS., PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 363
(2013) (“[T]he pharmaceutical industry has an obligation to communicate 
health information with integrity, accuracy, clarity, and completeness. This 
ethical obligation goes above and beyond any legal requirements.”). 
308 See Matthias Evers et al., How Pharma Manufacturers Can Enhance 
Their Medical Information Teams, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 9, 2018), https:// 
www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-in 
sights/how-pharma-manufacturers-can-enhance-their-medical-information-teams 
[https://perma.cc/HS7Z-NNGK] (“[P]harmaceutical manufacturers are under pres-
sure to find more efficient operating models to reduce operating costs ....”). 
309 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318; infra text ac-
companying notes 316–17. 
310 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48 and text accompanying note 73.  
311 The ethical risks of company speaker programs are even greater than the 
risks of company involvement in external CME programs, because in the former, 
no impartial host exists who can at least try to focus on and ensure objectivity 
and purity of motives. 
312 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318–20. 
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above the conflict of interest and maintain their objectivity, but 
this is naïve and unrealistic.313
 Disturbingly, one study found that while 85 percent of medi-
cal students recognize the impropriety of politicians accepting 
gifts, only 46 percent believe it is improper for themselves to ac-
cept a gift of the same value from a pharmaceutical company.314
This is distressing because a physician’s ethical responsibility 
when treating patients is to provide them with the best possible 
care.315 This duty is undermined by paid speaker programs in 
two ways: through the operation of reciprocity norms and informal 
indebtedness,316 and through the creation of warped incentives 
for the speaking physicians.317
a. The Operation of Reciprocity Norms and Informal  
Indebtedness 
 A physician who is handsomely paid by a drug manufacturer 
may feel indebted to the company that provided the opportunity.318
313 See id.
314 Paul Palmisano & Joan Edelstein, Teaching Drug Promotion Abuses to 
Health Professional Students, 55 J. MED. EDUC. 453, 455 (1980). 
315 See AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, https://www 
.ama-assn.org/about/publications-newsletters/ama-principles-medical-ethics 
[https://perma.cc/G3EQ-K3V4] (Jun. 2001) (“A physician shall, while caring 
for a patient, regard responsibility to the patient as paramount.”). 
316 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318. 
317 See id. 
318 Henry et al. have also identified the problem of “entanglement,” a ten-
dency for pharmaceutical companies and clinical researchers to build bundles 
of relationships that contribute to reciprocation of favor. David Henry et al., 
Ties that Bind: Multiple Relationships Between Clinical Researchers and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2493, 2493 (2005)
(“Research collaboration, an important and growing area of engagement be-
tween industry and clinical researchers, may lead to other significant rela-
tionships, such as advisory panel membership, payment for consultation to 
the industry, and substantial recompense to attend international conferences. 
These ties may create a sense of collegiality, and the resulting obligation and need 
to reciprocate may not be consciously felt.”) (citation omitted). Such multi-
layered bundles of entanglement exacerbate the concerns about paid speaker 
series. Id. at 2495–96. Not only may paid physicians skew their prescription 
patterns out of a sense of indebtedness; they may also consciously or uncon-
sciously skew their findings or actions relating to any research component 
that is included in the bundle of activities. Id.
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This is simply human nature, the playing out of well-documented 
human reciprocity norms.319 Payment can create in the recipient 
both gratitude and a desire or even a tacit requirement320 to re-
turn commensurate value to the payer.321 Reciprocity norms are 
so ingrained in us that they have become culturally and linguis-
tically entrenched;322 for example, we say that we need to invite 
friends to dinner because “we owe them” in return for past hos-
pitality that they provided to us. 
 This language reflects an urge to approach transactional 
equilibrium in relationships.323 Reciprocity norms do not end 
when we leave the dinner table and go to work.324 Pharmaceuti-
cal representatives who regularly visit a set of physicians strive 
to develop strong relationships with their doctors;325 indeed, 
basic attributes for which pharmaceutical representatives are 
hired are their persuasive abilities and their skill at building 
strong relationships.326 After all, their job is sales.327
319 See Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement,
25 AM. SOCIO. REV. 161, 161, 177–78 (1960) (examining in detail the nature of human 
reciprocity norms); Mark A. Whatley et al., The Effect of a Favor on Public and 
Private Compliance: How Internalized is the Norm of Reciprocity?, 21 BASIC & AP-
PLIED SOC. PSYCH.251,251–52 (1999) (discussing and examining reciprocity norms). 
320 This tacit requirement aspect of reciprocity is a function of what Keohane 
calls the “conditional action” implication of reciprocity. Robert O. Keohane, 
Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT’L ORG. 1, 5 (1986). There is an 
exchange of benefits, each understood to be conditional on the other. See id.
321 The social exchange literature discusses this in terms of “equivalence.” 
PETER M. BLAU, ON THE NATURE OF ORGANIZATIONS 208–09 (1974). 
322 See Gouldner, supra note 319, at 171–72. 
323 See Michael E. McCullough et al., An Adaptation for Altruism? The Social 
Causes, Social Effects, and Social Evolution of Gratitude, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCH. SCI. 281, 281 (2008) (“People feel grateful when they have benefitted 
from someone’s costly, intentional, voluntary effort on their behalf. Experi-
encing gratitude motivates beneficiaries to repay their benefactors ....”). 
324 See BLAU, supra note 321, at 209. 
325 See Michael J. Oldani, Thick Prescriptions: Toward an Interpretation of 
Pharmaceutical Sales Practices, 18 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 325, 332 (2004) 
(discussing building rapport, creating alliances, and gaining returns as measured 
in script numbers as among the multiple goals of pharmaceutical salespersons). 
326 Job listing templates recommend stating this job expectation upfront. See, 
e.g., Pharmaceutical Sales Representative Job Description, WORKABLE, https:// 
resources.workable.com/pharmaceutical-sales-representative-job-description 
[https://perma.cc/3PHP-U883] (including among the three recommended job 
responsibilities to list, “[l]iaising with and persuading targeted doctors to pre-
scribe our products utilizing effective sales skills.”). 
327 See id.
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 The scenario is this: the pharmaceutical representative, 
who has developed a good relationship with a doctor over time, 
communicates over the course of their many meetings a desire to 
have the doctor increase her prescription count for a drug the 
representative is marketing. At a strategic time, the pharmaceu-
tical representative offers the doctor a lucrative opportunity to be a 
paid speaker. 
 The doctor meets reciprocity norm expectations by return-
ing the favor and increasing the number of prescriptions.328
Whenever a physician’s prescription decisions are influenced by 
anything other than what is in the best interest of the patient’s 
treatment, there exists a problem.329
b. The Creation of Warped Incentives for the Speaking 
Physicians
 If reciprocity norms were the only dynamic at play in 
pharmaceutical company speaker programs, we might hope that 
professional ethics would prevail, and prescription decisions might 
remain immune to improper influences. Unfortunately, given 
human self-interest, this would be an unrealistic hope.330
 Moreover, the inclination to establish relational equilibri-
um by returning favors331 is not the only peril of drug company 
speaker programs.332 Physicians’ desire for repeat paid speaking 
invitations may influence the content of their presentations.333
 Doctors presumably agree to accept speaker invitations 
because such engagements are highly desirable.334 Of course, 
there are innocuous or even positive factors that might encourage 
328 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318–19. 
329 See id. at 320. 
330 See BLAU, infra note 331, at 2–7. 
331 This cycle of back-and-forth favors is at the heart of reciprocity norms. 
See PETER BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 6 (1964) (observing that 
reciprocity entails “actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from 
others and that cease when these expected reactions are not forthcoming”). 
332 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 317. 
333 See id. at 319–20. 
334 See id. at 318–19. 
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doctors to be speakers.335 If a doctor’s ego is gratified by having a 
platform to speak as an expert, this may well be an innocuous 
inducement.336 It is not likely to cause the speaker to sacrifice 
objectivity in the content delivered.337 Likewise, if part of the 
desirability of speaking is benevolent—a desire to share exper-
tise and knowledge to benefit the profession and patients—par-
ticipation in a speaker program certainly can have positive ef-
fects. Not all speakers at pharmaceutical company programs 
lack objectivity or are improperly influenced in the content they 
present.338
 Nonetheless, emolument is a potent factor in the desirability 
of speaking engagements.339 Speaker programs pay doctors gener-
ously.340 They are typically attractive dining and drinking events 
in expensive restaurants as well, creating a pleasant opportunity 
to socialize with colleagues and professional friends.341 Some 
doctors will value these engagements and work to encourage fu-
ture invitations.342 Presenting material favorable to the host 
company and its products increases the prospect of repeat invi-
tations.343 This creates an unacceptable risk to patients, whose 
treatments may be affected by biased content presented at these 
events.344
335 See Spiegel, supra note 292. 
336 See Freek Fickweiler et al., Interactions Between Physicians and the Phar-
maceutical Industry Generally and Sales Representatives Specifically and Their 
Association with Physicians’ Attitudes and Prescribing Habits: A Systematic 
Review, 7 BMJ OPEN, Sept. 27, 2017, at 1 (majority of physicians believe phar-
maceutical industry interactions have no impact on them). 
337 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 319–20. 
338 See id.
339 See Cassie Demeter, 69% of Pharmaceutical Companies Pay Their Speakers 
Based on Quality, BUS. WIRE (Jan. 6, 2014, 10:16 AM), https://www.business 
wire.com/news/home/20140106005287/en/69-Pharmaceutical-Companies-Pay 
-Speakers-based-Quality [http://perma.cc/3KSD-3HZ8]. 
340 See id. (reporting that speaker payments among surveyed companies 
averaged $1,677, and that “[c]ompanies may spend as much as $6,000 on a 
single speaker to entice him or her to speak at an event”). 
341 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318. 
342 See id.
343 See id. at 320. 
344 See Under the Influence, WAIKATO TIMES, Apr. 12, 2014, at 6. 
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c.  The Risk that Company Provision of Dining, Drinks, 
and Social Entertainment Will Hinder the Objectivity of 
Physicians Who Attend the Programs as Learners 
 Pharmaceutical company speaker programs raise another 
concern: the provision of education and entertainment directly 
from a manufacturer to an audience of invited physicians.345
Like the speakers, these doctors can be selected based on the com-
pany’s sales objectives.346 And given the profit motive of business, 
why would they not be? 
 As the direct recipients of education, dining, drinks, and 
entertainment, they are subject to both of the dynamics dis-
cussed in the preceding two subsections.347 This direct provision 
of benefit to company speaker series attendees, which was 
deemed unacceptable by Previous Opinion 8.061 of the AMA 
Code at continuing medical education events,348 is not prohibited 
by either the AMA or the PhRMA.349
 Yet attendees are subject to reciprocity norms at these 
events, at least as much as they would be at CME conferences.350
Moreover, they have incentives to curry future invitations, since 
unlike CME events that are open to all doctors, company-hosted 
speaker series are invitational events.351 As we have seen, we 
should be concerned that the content of the talk they will hear 
will not be scientifically objective, but rather skewed in favor of 
the host company’s product.352
 While the same quid pro quo dynamics apply to physicians 
in the audience as to physicians engaged to speak, the magnitude 
345 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318–19. 
346 See Allan S. Brett et al., Are Gifts from Pharmaceutical Companies 
Ethically Problematic? A Survey of Physicians, 163 ARCH INTERNAL MED.
2213, 2217 (2003) (“[T]he AMA guidelines focus inordinately on fine distinc-
tions regarding the value or type of gifts, and are not sufficiently concerned 
with the ultimate rationale for industry-sponsored gifts and activities, ie, to 
establish relationships with physicians that yield increased sales of a compa-
ny’s products.”). 
347 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318. 
348 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
349 See Brett et al., supra note 346, at 2217. 
350 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318. 
351 See id. at 319. 
352 See id. at 320. 
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of the conflict-based risk is, of course, lower for those attending 
than for those speaking.353 This is a function of the degree of the 
benefit conferred. Speaker fees are likely to be valued higher 
than receipt of a free seminar and meal.354 Of course, to the ex-
tent that a target group of physicians is rotated from occasional 
speaker roles at some programs to audience member roles at 
others, an overall package of treats for physicians results.355
Sometimes a doctor is the paid speaker; other times she is a 
generously entertained guest.356 This overall relational package 
is fraught with implications of indebtedness, undesirable incen-
tives, and potentially skewed content.357
d. The Relative Likelihood of Pharmaceutical Company 
Speaker Programs Being Predominantly Beneficial or 
Predominantly Harmful 
 The harms of company speaker programs outweigh the 
benefits.358 The single possible benefit is the education of doctors.359
Even this benefit is not weighty, given the various alternative 
sources of knowledge and information available to medical prac-
titioners in 2020, including that which now comes out of research 
universities.360 This single benefit of company speaker programs 
is tainted by all the conflicts of interest we have explored.361
 Abundant external medical conferences and seminars, as 
noted earlier, can ethically be financially supported by compa-
nies under appropriate guidelines, which this Article has already 
suggested are those that were contained in Previous Opinion 
8.061 of the AMA Code, rather than the diluted guidelines that 
353 See infra note 354 and accompanying text. 
354 This proposition seems likely, given the generous fees speakers are 
paid at these events. See Demeter, supra note 339. 
355 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 318. 
356 See id.
357 See id.
358 See infra notes 359–66 and accompanying text. 
359 See Howard Brody, Pharmaceutical Industry Financial Support for 
Medical Education: Benefit, or Undue Influence?, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 451, 
451 (2009).
360 See supra Section II.A. 
361 See generally Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290. 
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replaced it in 2016.362 Scholarly and professional medical jour-
nals also are widely available,363 and of course the Internet pro-
vides a wealth of information.364 Although Internet information 
on all subjects must be carefully assessed for credibility,365 it is 
reasonable to expect trained physicians to evaluate sources with 
a critical eye. 
 No laws, regulations, professional or industrial codes, or 
policies presently prohibit pharmaceutical company-hosted 
speaker programs.366 And as we shall see in the following Sub-
section, disclosure requirements are inadequate to address the 
conflict of interest and attendant moral peril that we have ex-
plored here regarding speaker programs. 
e. Disclosure of Conflict of Interest Is a Positive Step, but It 
Is Insufficient to Protect Patients’ Interests 
 In several countries, law or regulation requires the public 
disclosure of payments that doctors receive from drug compa-
nies.367 In the United States, the Physician Payments Sunshine 
Act requires that drug manufacturers disclose comprehensive 
information regarding payments, including honoraria, to “cov-
ered recipients.”368 Failure to disclose financial conflicts of inter-
est may be considered research misconduct.369
362 See supra Section III.A. 
363 See Karen M. Albert, Open Access: Implications for Scholarly Publish-
ing and Medical Libraries, 94 J. MED. LIBR. ASS’N 253 (2006) (discussing how 
open access publishing facilitates access to research publications). 
364 See id. at 255. 
365 See Karen Struthers, Assessing the Credibility of Online Sources, LEO:
LITERACY EDUC. ONLINE (Jan. 7, 2005), https://leo.stcloudstate.edu/research 
/credibility1.html [https://perma.cc/N5L4-BKMP] (offering a checklist of crite-
ria for evaluating the credibility of an online source, based on authorship, 
publisher, currency, perspectives, coverage, and accuracy or verifiability). 
366 See Fugh-Berman & Homedes, supra note 290, at 320. 
367 See Under the Influence, supra note 344 (“Around the world, countries 
are increasingly requiring public disclosure of drug company gifts and pay-
ments to doctors.”). 
368 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h(a)(1)(A) (2010) (requiring, inter alia, that “any 
applicable manufacturer that provides a payment or other transfer of value to 
a covered recipient (or to an entity or individual at the request of or designated 
on behalf of a covered recipient), shall submit to the Secretary, in such electronic 
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 This reported information is readily accessible to patients, 
as well as prospective patients who want to research their op-
tions, via a government website.370 As the header to the website 
states, “[t]he Open Payments Search Tool is used to search 
payments made by drug and medical device companies to physi-
cians and teaching hospitals.”371 The site also discloses the 
amounts of these payments, and as of this writing, the most recent 
aggregate data on the disclosed payments is for 2019, showing a 
total reported of $10.03 billion.372
 The site has a tab that explains the function of the data: 
“Open Payments is a national disclosure program that promotes 
a more transparent and accountable health care system by mak-
ing the financial relationships between applicable manufacturers 
and group purchasing organizations (GPOs) and health care provid-
ers (physicians and teaching hospitals) available to the public.”373
form as the Secretary shall require, the following information with respect to 
the preceding calendar year: (i) The name of the covered recipient. (ii) The 
business address of the covered recipient and, in the case of a covered recipi-
ent who is a physician, the specialty and National Provider Identifier of the 
covered recipient. (iii) The amount of the payment or other transfer of value. 
(iv) The dates on which the payment or other transfer of value was provided 
to the covered recipient. (v) A description of the form of the payment or other 
transfer of value, indicated (as appropriate for all that apply) as—(I) cash or 
a cash equivalent; (II) in-kind items or services; (III) stock, a stock option, or 
any other ownership interest, dividend, profit, or other return on investment; 
or (IV) any other form of payment or other transfer of value (as defined by the 
Secretary). (vi) A description of the nature of the payment or other transfer of 
value, indicated (as appropriate for all that apply) as—(I) consulting fees; (II) 
compensation for services other than consulting; (III) honoraria; (IV) gift; (V) 
entertainment; (VI) food; (VII) travel (including the specified destinations); (VIII) 
education; (IX) research; (X) charitable contribution; (XI) royalty or license; (XII) 
current or prospective ownership or investment interest; (XIII) direct com-
pensation for serving as faculty or as a speaker for a medical education pro-
gram; (XIV) grant; or (XV) any other nature of the payment or other transfer 
of value (as defined by the Secretary).”). 
369 See generally Jeffrey R. Botkin, Should Failure to Disclose Significant 
Financial Conflicts of Interest Be Considered Research Misconduct?, 320 
JAMA 2307, 2308 (2018). 




373 Id. at Learn More About Open Payments tab, https://www.cms.gov/open 
payments [https://perma.cc/6G9Y-DVK9]. 
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 Unfortunately, disclosure is inadequate to address conflict 
of interest concerns.374 If disclosure of physician payments is to 
protect patients, we would want evidence that patients actually 
retrieve and use the information. The evidence, however, sug-
gests otherwise.375 In addition, there are systemic conditions in 
place that limit the effectiveness of information and disclosure 
as means of managing conflicts of interest.376 The following dis-
cussion addresses these two limitations, and concludes that dis-
closure does not sufficiently address the conflict of interest when 
drug companies pay prescribing physicians as presenters in their 
speaker programs. 
i. Evidence Suggests that Few Patients Consult the 
Currently Available Information Regarding  
Physician Payments 
 Unfortunately, the information collected and published 
under the Physician Payments Sunshine Act is rarely used.377 Of 
3,500 adult patients in one year studied, sixty-five percent had 
seen physicians who had received a payment or gift from either 
a drug or medical device company, but only five percent were 
aware of the payment or gift.378
 It is not surprising that few patients use the data availa-
ble. Some will be unaware that the database exists.379 People are 
busy, life is complex, and information on every conceivable topic 
abounds on the Internet.380 Moreover, information is often con-
flicting, even information provided by “experts,”381 tempting the 
374 See infra Section III.B.2.e.i–ii. 
375 See infra Section III.B.2.e.i. 
376 See infra Section III.B.2.e.i. 
377 See Many Doctors Get Payments from Drug Companies, Study Shows,





380 See Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing 
Search Engines with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 43, 52 (1998) (“The 
amount of information has expanded far beyond our ability to process or com-
prehend it.”). 
381 See Nathan F. Dieckmann et al., Public Perceptions of Expert Disagreement: 
Bias and Incompetence or a Complex and Random World?, 26 PUB. UNDER-
STANDING OF SCI. 325 (2017) (noting expert disagreement may be perceived by 
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public to give up on disclosure models created to ensure their 
safety.382 We are both weary and wary of seeking and evaluating 
disclosures and warnings.383
 What remains is a philosophical question: Does it matter 
that few patients are aware of conflicts of interest, given that 
the conflicts can easily be discovered?384 Some will say it does not 
matter, and that the information is readily available, thus indi-
vidual patients should be responsible for doing research relating to 
their treatment choices, including the doctor they select.385 This 
approach would lean toward a philosophy of minimal regulation 
and even minimal professional and industry self-regulation.386 Un-
der this philosophy, as many potential hazards as possible should 
be addressed solely through disclosure, rather than through le-
gal or ethics code prohibitions or self-prohibitions, with the goal 
of minimizing government, professional, and industry controls 
and maximizing freedoms of both consumers and businesses.387
 A counterargument focuses on realities rather than on 
theory: the vast majority of patients are not aware of pharmaceuti-
cal company payments to their physician, despite the information 
knowledgeable, educated people as reflecting things such as complexity, ran-
domness, and financial bias). 
382 See Petra Persson, Attention Manipulation and Information Overload,
2 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 1, 78 (2018). 
383 The literature discusses this phenomenon in terms of information over-
load. See, e.g., id. at 78 (discussing how “[c]ompetitive information supply 
from firms competing for attention can reduce consumers’ knowledge by causing 
information overload.”); Josephine B. Schmitt et al., Too Much Information? 
Predictors of Information Overload in the Context of Online News Exposure,
21 INFO. COMM. & SOC. 1151, 1151 (2018) (“The difficulty to evaluate and se-
lect relevant information increases as more and more diverse sources and 
content are available.”). 
384 See Many Doctors Get Payments from Drug Companies, Study Shows, 
supra note 377. 
385 See id.
386 For discussion of this regulation reduction philosophy, see John W. Mayo, 
The Evolution of Regulation: Twentieth Century Lessons and Twenty-First 
Century Opportunities, 65 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 119, 126 (2013) (“[B]eginning 
in the 1960s, economists began to look upon the institution of regulation with 
newfound skepticism. This skeptical inquiry revealed that regulation was an 
imperfect governance mechanism that could not be assumed to promote the pub-
lic interest. A second, more subtle but potentially more profound driver came from 
policymakers who saw deregulation as a means to promote an ideological end, 
specifically to ease governmental coercion and promote economic freedoms.”). 
387 See id. at 120. 
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being available online.388 While patients can protect themselves 
from improperly influenced treatment, almost none actually do.389
Arguably, regulation or professional/industry self-regulation pro-
tective of the public is sometimes justified, even when it constrains 
some freedoms such as physicians’ freedom to contract with com-
panies.390 If so, this is one such situation. Prohibition or curtail-
ment of conflicts may be the only way to protect the public, since 
the disclosure does not provide appreciable protection.391
 One final consideration: when disclosure is used to shield 
the public from perils, there may be socio-economic differences 
in who is protected and who is not, due to the digital divide.392
The poor have less ready access than the wealthy to computers, 
connections, and the Internet, and therefore to information dis-
closed and retrievable on websites,393 and minorities have less 
access than non-minorities.394 Unsurprisingly, studies suggest 
that those with lower educational and income levels are generally 
disadvantaged in the quality of both the healthcare that they 
receive and their health generally.395
 Should this socio-economic discrepancy influence our deci-
sion between allowing the conflict of interest activities we have 
been discussing subject to disclosure, versus outright prohibiting 
388 See supra text accompanying note 378. 
389 See supra text accompanying note 378. 
390 See generally INST. OF MED., PROMOTING HEALTH: INTERVENTION STRATE-
GIES FROM SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2000). 
391 See Many Doctors Get Payments from Drug Companies, Study Shows, 
supra note 377. 
392 Edwards describes the digital divide as “the increasingly disparate access 
to, knowledge of, and use of technology in this country that is a function of race or 
ethnic group, physical disability, income, education, gender, household com-
position, age, and location.” Yolanda D. Edwards, Looking Beyond the Digital 
Divide, 57 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 585 (2005) (reviewing ANTHONY G. WILHELM,
DIGITAL NATION: TOWARD AN INCLUSIVE INFORMATION SOCIETY (2004)). 
393 Id.
394 Id.
395 See Nicholas C. Arpey et al., How Socioeconomic Status Affects Patient 
Perceptions of Health Care: A Qualitative Study, 8 J. PRIMARY CARE & CMTY.
HEALTH 169 (2017) (“There is evidence that socioeconomic status (SES) affects in-
dividual’s [sic] health outcomes and the health care they receive. People of 
lower SES are more likely to have worse self-reported health, lower life expec-
tancy, and suffer from more chronic conditions when compared with those of 
higher SES. They also receive fewer diagnostic tests and medications for 
many chronic diseases and have limited access to health care due to cost and 
coverage.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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the activities? It can be argued that in a free society with free 
markets, the wealthy can justifiably buy advantages less available 
to others.396 This is easier to accept in regard, say, to purchasing 
Rolls-Royce automobiles than to healthcare. Regarding physician 
conflicts of interest, the idea is unsatisfying on two levels. 
 First, we are not talking about who can and cannot pur-
chase luxury consumables; rather, we are talking about funda-
mental and basic safeguards in how people are provided with 
medical treatment, which should be sound, safe, and effective for 
everyone, not just for the wealthy.397 Second, to the extent that 
there are racial or ethnic discrepancies in protection levels under a 
disclosure model, we should rise to the challenge of affording the 
same basic protections for all.398 In sum, disclosure as the means to 
address these conflicts of interest is ineffectual and inadequate. 
ii. Systemic Conditions Limit the Effectiveness of  
Information and Disclosure as Means to Manage 
Conflicts of Interest 
 Using disclosure to provide information to consumers, and 
then expecting consumers to protect themselves, depends on con-
sumers having real choice in the marketplace.399
396 See id. at 172. 
397 This argument might follow a philosophy wherein “a political and legal 
order should be maximally accountable to the representative occupants of the 
most powerless positions defined by that order, consistent with the equal lib-
erties and fair equality of opportunity principles.” Xavier Marquez, Maximiz-
ing Accountability to the Least Privileged: The Difference Principle, the Fair 
Value of the Political Liberties, and the Design of Democratic Institutions, 47 
POLITY 484, 484 (2015). For analysis of healthcare as a basic right, see gener-
ally Anita Pereira, Note and Comment, Live and Let Live: Healthcare is a 
Fundamental Human Right, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 481 (2004). 
398 See Aleksandra Jovic-Vranes et al., Education on Human Rights and 
Healthcare: Evidence from Serbia, 30 HEALTH PROMOTION INT’L 101 (2014)
(“Regardless of gender, age, race or socioeconomic background, we consider 
our health to be our most important and essential asset. Increasing attention 
has been paid to the right to the highest attainable standard of healthcare, 
especially by human rights monitoring bodies, such as the World Health Or-
ganization and the Commission on Human Rights.”) (citation omitted). 
399 See Serge-Christophe Kolm, On Real Economic Freedom, 35 SOC.
CHOICE & WELFARE. 351, 351–52 (2010) (observing that “possible choice” is a 
component of actual freedom) (citation omitted). 
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 Choice of physician, however, is often constrained, and 
therefore illusory, under managed health care.400 Many patients 
cannot just choose the doctor they prefer.401 We depend on insur-
ance coverage to pay for health care,402 and managed healthcare 
has evolved to limit our free choice of physician.403 Participation 
in a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) requires the use 
of HMO doctors.404 Patients covered by Preferred Provider Or-
ganizations (PPOs) instead of HMOs are required by the plans 
to use designated preferred provider physicians in order to get 
the plan’s lower rates.405 While we might like the idea of avoid-
ing regulation and ethics code constraints and leaving free 
agents in free markets to make informed choices subject to dis-
closure of conflicts, free agency under managed healthcare is se-
riously constrained.406
 The absence of choice for many in selecting a physician is 
not the only aspect of managed health care that undermines our 
ability to try to protect ourselves. It is exacerbated by a second 
phenomenon: prescription plans contract favorable rates with 
certain manufacturers, and they substitute a prescribing physi-
cian’s choice with a contractually favored, cheaper option.407 While 
400 Goran Ridic et al., Comparisons of Health Care Systems in the United 
States, Germany and Canada, 24 MATERIA SOCIO MEDICA 112, 119 (2012). 
401 See id. at 116. 
402 See, e.g., Amy Davidoff et al., The Effect of Parents’ Insurance Coverage 
on Access to Care for Low-Income Children, 40 INQUIRY 254, 255 (2003) (“Par-
ents’ insurance coverage ... may affect access to care for their children.”). 
403 Ridic et al., supra note 400, at 119. 
404 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., PHYSICIAN 
PERSPECTIVES OF MEDICARE HMOS 1 (1998) (“Most HMOs operate on a gate-
keeper system, in which a patient selects a primary care physician from a 
group of approved plan providers to act as her or his first point of contact 
within the health care system. This physician must authorize any specialist, 
hospital, or other type of care the patient receives.”). 
405 Ridic et al., supra note 400, at 116 (“PPOs are a third party payer that 
offers financial incentives such as low out-of-pocket prices, to enrollees who 
acquire medical care from a preset list of physicians and hospitals.”). 
406 See id.
407 This process typically entails drug formularies, which list specific med-
ications that an insurance plan will cover. Michael Ollove, New Rules Aim to 
Keep Patients on Medications that Work, PEW TRUSTS (Feb. 2, 2017), https:// 
www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/02/02/new   
-rules-aim-to-keep-patients-on-medications-that-work [https://perma.cc/EUV9 
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this practice does not itself directly concern conflicts of interest 
that may cause doctors to sub-optimally treat or prescribe, it 
does have ethical and policy implications of its own, and it com-
pounds the fact that patients often have little control over the 
quality of the treatments they will receive.408 It contributes to the 
overall problem we are addressing here: that physicians uninflu-
enced by extraneous influences often are not the ultimate decision-
makers about a patient’s specific pharmaceutical treatment.409
 The containment of health care costs is a pressing social 
and economic concern, so these issues created by managed 
healthcare are not created without some justification.410 On the 
other hand, it is not clear that cost savings are actually passed 
on to consumers, rather than simply retained by insurers and 
pharmaceutical retailers as additional profit.411 As compelling as 
-XYVS]. Formularies are sometimes changed abruptly, financially causing 
patients to be put on alternative medications to those that may be working 
well for them. Id. There has been some consumer protection movement to curtail 
or restrict perceived formulary abuses, but formularies remain a reality for 
many patients. Id.
408 While this secondary consideration does not trigger the prescribing doc-
tor conflict of interest concerns that are the subject of this Article, it does ex-
acerbate the current precariousness for patients hoping to receive the best 
possible care. Recent Cases, First Amendment—Commercial Speech—Second 
Circuit Holds That Prohibiting Truthful Off-Label Promotion of FDA-Approved 
Drugs by Pharmaceutical Representatives Violates First Amendment.— United
States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012), 127 HARV. L. REV. 795, 802 (2013) 
(internal citations omitted). It adds an additional layer of risk and subopti-
mal drug selection, increasing the chances that a patient will get inferior ra-
ther than ideal treatment. Id. This dynamic adds to an overall environment 
that reduces patient control and autonomy over treatment due to augmented 
corporate prerogative in drug choices. See Hannah Fresques, Doctors Pre-
scribe More of a Drug if They Receive Money from a Pharma Company Tied to 
It, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2019, 12 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article 
/doctors-prescribe-more-of-a-drug-if-they-receive-money-from-a-pharma-com 
pany-tied-to-it [https://perma.cc/P5PF-V9NK]. In such an environment, dis-
closure protections are less convincingly adequate than regulatory restrictions. 
409 See Ollove, supra note 407. 
410 See Alfonso R. Oddo, Healthcare Ethics: A Patient-Centered Decision 
Model, 29 J. BUS. ETHICS 125, 125 (2001) (observing the tension between 
high-quality healthcare and a need to keep costs contained). 
411 See, e.g., Barak Richman et al., Mergers between health insurers and 
pharmacy benefit managers could be bad for your health, STAT (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.statnews.com/2018/06/01/mergers-health-insurers-pharmacy-ben 
efit-managers/ [https://perma.cc/5FV5-NZC5]. 
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containment of healthcare costs is, patient safety and ensuring 
basic integrity in the delivery of healthcare must ultimately be 
our primary goals. Methods of controlling costs should not come 
at the expense of patient safety. 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
 Our analysis so far leads to two overarching observations. 
First, conflict of interest is a serious problem affecting the ethically, 
medically sound treatment of patients.412 Second, these issues 
should be addressed by changes in the professional ethics codes of 
both the medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry.413
A. Conflict of Interest Is a Serious Problem Affecting the Ethically, 
Medically Sound Treatment of Patients 
 Conflict of interest often creates untenable temptations 
for doctors to alter their prescription patterns for reasons other 
than the best interests of their patients.414 Survey research has 
suggested that, “[d]espite the recent publicity about ethical prob-
lems in relationships between physicians and the pharmaceutical 
industry, ... physicians ... continue to have a rather permissive view 
about a variety of marketing activities.”415
 Consider the example of physicians treated to free travel 
and expenses to attend symposia on a company’s new drugs.416
According to a recent article, “[e]ighty-five percent of [such] phy-
sicians interviewed stated that accepting such invitations would 
not influence their use of the drugs. Nevertheless, their pre-
scriptions for those drugs nearly tripled after the meetings, far 
above increases in the use of those drugs nationally.”417 This 
suggests that some physicians are unaware of unconscious bias-
es that may affect their patient treatment decisions.418
412 Oddo, supra note 410. 
413 PHARMA 2020 CODE, supra note 95, at 2. 
414 Aaron E. Carroll, Doctors’ Magical Thinking About Conflicts of Interest,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/upshot/doctors 
-magical-thinking-about-conflicts-of-interest.html [https://perma.cc/F8A9-674P]. 
415 Brett et al., supra note 346, at 2217–18 (reflecting on data surveying 
both experienced and inexperienced physicians at one institution). 
416 Carroll, supra note 414. 
417 Id.
418 Id.
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 Other data confirm that self-serving temptations are re-
lated to patient treatment decisions.419 ProPublica, for example, has 
found a connection between drug company payments/entertainment 
and brand-name prescription levels: 
Doctors who got money from drug and device makers pre-
scribed a higher percentage of brand-name drugs overall than 
doctors who didn’t .... Even those who simply got meals from 
companies prescribed more brand-name drugs, on average. 
Moreover, as payments increased, brand-name prescribing 
rates tended to as well. Doctors who received more than 
$5,000 from companies in 2014 typically had the highest 
brand-name prescribing percentages. Among internists who 
received no payments, for example, the average brand-name 
prescribing rate was about 20 percent, compared to about 30 
percent for those who received more than $5,000.420
 Of course, such research identifies only correlation, not cau-
sality.421 Yet suspicion of causality is reasonable. Humans can be 
self-serving, and alternative explanations are hard to fathom.422
The observed relationship between higher physician compensation 
and higher prescription activity suggests a corrupt causality.423
 There is another reason to suspect a causal relationship 
between emolument and brand name prescription: the proliferation 
of brand name prescribing associated with industry payments 
thrives despite concerted professional efforts to decrease brand 
name prescriptions in favor of more inexpensive generics.424 In 
2015, the American College of Physicians called on doctors to 
prescribe generic drugs rather than branded medications when 
possible, in part to contain costs.425
419 Charles Ornstein et al., Drug-Company Payments Mirror Doctors’ 





422 ANDREW M. KAMARCK, ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE: AN APPROACH 
TO NONAUTISTIC THEORY 22 (2002). 
423 Ornstein et al., supra note 419. 
424 Honor Whiteman, Doctors Should Prescribe Generic Drugs Over Brand-
ed Medications, Say Experts, MED. NEWS TODAY (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www 
.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/303039.php [https://perma.cc/4QN8-HWX6]. 
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 Cheaper generic drugs are in patients’ and the health care 
system’s interest, as “[t]he majority of peer-reviewed studies [have] 
found that generic equivalents to brand-name drugs produce 
similar clinical outcomes ....”426 If generics are professionally con-
sidered preferable to branded drugs, it strains credulity to think 
that the ProPublica study’s findings reflect anything but im-
properly subverted motives.427 There is a lack of convincing al-
ternative explanations for why industry payments to doctors are 
associated with increased brand-name prescribing. 
 Other data also suggest that pharmaceutical company pay-
ment to doctors corrupts prescription patterns.428 Direct evidence 
links corporate benefit conferral to an increased prescription of 
the benefactor’s products.429 Consider an analysis done jointly by 
Harvard researchers and CNN, which examined Medicare Part D 
prescription data, as well as pharmaceutical company payment data 
obtained from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
from 2014–2015.430 CNN’s report noted the following findings: 
Doctors were more likely to get paid by drug companies if 
they prescribed a lot of opioids—and they were more likely to 
get paid a lot of money. Among doctors in the top 25th percentile 
of opioid prescribers by volume, 72% received payments. Among 
those in the top fifth percentile, 84% received payments. Among 
the very biggest prescribers—those in the top 10th of 1%—95% 
received payments. On average, doctors whose opioid prescription 
volume ranked among the top 5% nationally received twice as 
much money from the opioid manufacturers, compared with 
doctors whose prescription volume was in the median. Doctors 
in the top 1% of opioid prescribers received on average four 
times as much money as the typical doctor. Doctors in the top 
10th of 1%, on average, received nine times more money than 
the typical doctor.431
426 Id.
427 See Ornstein et al., supra note 419. 
428 Aaron Kessler et al., The More Opioids Doctors Prescribe, the More 
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 The implications of this study are compelling. As with the 
other correlational findings we have discussed here, the rela-
tionship could of course theoretically be coincidental, or caused 
by variables other than corruption. Yet once again, if we try to 
theorize alternative explanations, they strain belief. The proba-
bility of coincidence or alternative causality explanations across 
all these studies decreases with each data set that essentially 
finds the same basic phenomenon.432
 We are left with two possibilities: drug companies reward 
high prescribers with emoluments, or physicians become high 
prescribers in hope of currying personal, profitable favor with 
drug companies. Or both. Whichever might come first here, the 
chicken or the egg, is really irrelevant, as the implied exchange 
relationship is a loop of mutually desired give-and-take.433 Either 
of these two explanations suggests an ethically unacceptable 
quid pro quo that harms the public.434
B. The Issues Identified Should Be Addressed by Changes in the 
Professional Ethics Codes of Both the Medical Profession and 
the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 Both the American Medical Association and the Pharma-
ceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America have ad-
dressed potential conflicts of interest among doctors and drug 
companies.435 Sometimes these professional organizations have 
created effective constraints and ethical restrictions, and some-
times they have left troubling practices in place.436
 Our analysis has focused on two practices that continue to 
raise conflict of interest challenges to law, public policy, and pro-
fessional and industry ethics codes: subsidization of professional 
432 Sarah Elizabeth Adler, Drug Firm Payments to Doctors Boost Prescrip-
tion Spending, AARP (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.aarp.org/politics-society/ad 
vocacy/info-2020/drug-firm-payments-to-doctors-impact-consumers.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8ENF-D2QT]. 
433 Henry et al., supra note 318, at 2493. 
434 Id.
435 See supra Part I. 
436 Christy Ford Chapin, Opinion, How Did Health Care Get to Be Such a 
Mess?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/opin 
ion/health-insurance-american-medical-association.html [https://perma.cc/6E 
6S-M5K9] (criticizing the AMA for its past actions). 
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conferences and CME, and company-hosted speaker series. This 
examination has suggested that subsidization of professional 
conferences and CME under Former Opinion 8.061 of the AMA 
Code passed muster and provided more value than peril,437 but 
that the diluted protections in Current Opinion 9.2.7 are inade-
quate.438 If the AMA is to continue to condone industry involve-
ment in these activities, it should revert to the former, more robust 
standards that it eliminated in 2016.439 Otherwise, the conflict 
of interest is not acceptably managed and should not be consid-
ered ethically defensible. 
 Company-hosted speaker series are a different matter, 
and they simply do not pass serious ethical scrutiny. These pro-
grams create an unacceptable risk that treatment decisions may 
be undermined by temptations of self-interest.440
 We have seen that pharmaceutical speaker programs pro-
vide dubious social benefit while exacting substantial social costs.441
We also observed that current disclosure requirements are not 
adequate to address these costs.442 If pharmaceutical company 
speaker programs are untenable from the standpoints of ethics 
and public policy, what can and should we do about them? 
 One approach might be to try to prohibit them by law. 
Legislation and regulation both, however, open the door to po-
tential First Amendment challenges.443 Arguably, there might 
be defenses supporting the regulation of the speaker programs, 
as they ostensibly would not attempt to prohibit companies from 
speaking, but rather would restrict the time, place and manner 
in which they speak.444
437 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
438 See Opinion 9.2.7, supra note 48. 
439 See Opinion 8.061, supra note 49. 
440 Stephen A. Jonas et al., Speaker Programs and the Pharmaceutical In-
dustry, N.Y.U. SCH. L. (Feb. 6, 2020), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforce 
ment/2020/02/06/speaker-programs-and-the-pharmaceutical-industry/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7BUD-W6RY]. 
441 See supra Section III.B.2.d. 
442 See supra Section III.B.2.e. 
443 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989). 
444 See id. (“[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions on the 
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are jus-
tified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are 
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 In any event, professional and industry exercise of ethical 
responsibility is preferable to externally imposed legal accounta-
bility. It is always preferable to avoid government regulation when 
the public good can be achieved by voluntary self-restraint in-
stead.445 AMA and PhRMA self-policing is a cleaner way to elim-
inate pharmaceutical company speaker programs. The AMA should 
prohibit doctors from participating in them and the PhRMA 
should prohibit companies from continuing to host them. 
 Self-interest may lead both physicians and pharmaceuti-
cal companies to seek less restrictive means of self-policing.446
They may look for ways to continue some version of company 
speaker programs that arguably address the concerns raised 
here. What that would look like is not immediately apparent, 
given that the incentives for doctors to speak and companies to 
host are likely to largely be self-interested ones. 
 It would therefore be a thorny challenge to save the gen-
eral concept of company-hosted speaker series while sufficiently 
addressing all the ethical concerns. Whatever the ultimate ap-
proach to these issues, it is time that healthcare professionals 
and industry alike make a clear, unequivocal commitment to 
placing the well-being of patients above personal and commer-
cial advantage. 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they 
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’”) 
(quoting Clark v. Comty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
445 See Peter Grajzl et al., Allocating Lawmaking Powers: Self-regulation 
vs Government Regulation, 35 J. COMPAR. ECON. 520 (2007) (“Inefficient regu-
lation occurs more frequently than inefficient self-regulation.”). 
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